Syracuse University

SURFACE
College of Law - Faculty Scholarship

College of Law

2007

Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's Shotgun
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol
David M. Driesen
Syracuse University. College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub
Part of the Economic Policy Commons, and the Environmental Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Driesen, David M., "Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's Shotgun Wedding: Emissions
Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol" (2007). College of Law - Faculty Scholarship. 23.
https://surface.syr.edu/lawpub/23

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at SURFACE. It has been accepted for
inclusion in College of Law - Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information,
please contact surface@syr.edu.

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET LIBERALISM’S
SHOTGUN WEDDING:
EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

David M. Driesen*
Angela S. Cooney Professor
Syracuse University College of Law
Syracuse, NY 13244-1030
ddriesen@law.syr.edu
(315) 443-4218

May 12, 2007

*

J.D. Yale Law School (1989). The author would like to thank Michael Barr, Robert Howse, Nina
Mendelsohn, Tom Tietenberg, and the participants in the University of Michigan Legal Theory Workshop
for helpful comments, Dean Hannah Arterian for research support, and Molly Curtis for research
assistance. Any errors, of course, belong to me.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=986145

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET LIBERALISM’S
SHOTGUN WEDDING:
EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the international emissions trading regime at the heart of the
world’s effort to address global warming as a means of exploring broader international
governance issues. The trading regime seeks to marry two models of global governance,
market liberalism, which embraces markets as the model of global governance, and
sustainable development, which seeks to change development patterns to protect future
generations.
This article explores a previously unacknowledged tension between market
liberalism’s goal of maximizing short term cost effectiveness and sustainable
development’s goal of catalyzing technological change for the benefit of future
generations. This article presents new data and theory unsettling the traditional view that
market mechanisms encourage innovations vital to sustainable development. Market
actors fail to take positive spillovers, e.g. benefits accruing to competitors and thence to
future generations, into account in making technological choices. Because of this failure
to take long-term economic development into account, the international trading markets
have contributed far less to sustainable energy development than more targeted programs.
Consideration of these spillovers yields fresh insights. Market liberalism’s ideal
of comprehensive evaluation of costs and benefits conflicts with its preference for free
markets. Conversely, sustainable development advocates’ tendency to rely on collective
decision-making to make difficult technological choices may prove unrealistic. This
article unsettles prevailing notions of governance and seeks to stimulate a richer more
subtle discourse about the roles of government and markets in addressing global
problems.
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Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding:
Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol
I. INTRODUCTION
An entrepreneur in India wishes to implement a project reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases, which trap heat and thereby contribute to global warming.1 She plans
to sell credits representing her project’s emission reductions to owners of coal-fired
power plants in Germany, who face emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto
Protocol or Kyoto).2 Under the Kyoto Protocol’s emission trading programs, these plant
owners can purchase credits reflecting the emission reductions generated by foreign
environmental projects in lieu of making all of the required greenhouse gas reductions at
their own facilities.3 So, if our entrepreneur develops a suitable project, a European
company may pay her for the credits her emission reduction project generates, enabling
her to make a profit.

1

See ANDREW E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 8 (2006) (explaining that greenhouse gases warm the earth by
absorbing infrared radiation that would otherwise escape into space).
2
December 11, 1997, Report to the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, 3rd
Sess. Pt. 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. See
generally FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME: A
GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROCEDURES (2004); MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999).
3
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12; Kevin A. Baumert, Note, Participation of
Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 365, 383 (2006) (explaining that the Kyoto Protocol’s “Clean Development
Mechanism” allows “companies from industrialized countries to . . . receive emission reduction credits
from projects based in developing countries.”). See generally David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap
Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1,
27-35 (1998) (analyzing the key language in the Kyoto Protocol authorizing trading). In all likelihood, the
producer can only substitute credits for “some” of her reductions, because the Kyoto Protocol requires that
trading function as a supplement to domestic reductions. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 6(1)(d),
12(3)(b), 17. For any particular producer, the extent of permissible reliance on foreign credits will depend
upon domestic trading rules implementing the Kyoto Protocol’s “supplementarity” requirement.

Let us assume that she faces a choice between two emission reduction projects.
One project involves using an end-of-the-pipe technology to control HFC 23, a potent
greenhouse gas.4 The other involves installing a new type solar energy technology, a
form of renewable energy, thereby avoiding emissions of carbon dioxide, the most
ubiquitous greenhouse gas.5 In this situation, our entrepreneur would likely choose the
option that produces the cheapest emission reductions.6 Since HFC 23 control usually
costs less than solar power installation, she would likely choose the end-of-the-pipe
option.7 Is this society’s best choice?

4

See PricewaterhouseCoopers (P) Ltd., CDM Project Design Document: Project for GHG
Emission Reduction by Thermal Oxidation of HFC 23 at HCFC 22 Plant of Gujarat Fluorochemicals
Limited at 8 (2003), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/registered.html [hereinafter HFC PDD] (describing
installation and operation of a thermal oxidation system to control HFC 23 emissions).
5
See Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal
Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and an Analysis of the European
Union’s CO2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865,
936 (2005) (explaining that renewable energy reduces emissions by avoiding fossil fuel combustion);
WORKING GROUP III TO THE SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995 - ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
241 (James P. Bruce et al. eds., 1996) (noting that renewable energy sources emit little carbon and that
switching to them reduces emissions); Kirsten Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to MarketBased Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L. Q. 243, 270 n. 73
(1999). See generally Simone Espey, Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Means for Trade With Electricity
from Renewable Energy Sources, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 557, 558 (2001) (explaining that renewable resources
are “inexhaustible”).
6
These technological options involve choosing between reductions of two different
greenhouse gases. The climate change regime employs scientific assessment of different greenhouse gases’
relative contributions to global warming to create trading ratios, measuring the value of all relevant
emission reductions in carbon dioxide equivalents. See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The
Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate Policy: Issues of Design and Practicability, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 83, 86 (1992); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), WORKING GROUP I,
IPCC THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, ch. 6, pt. 12, subpt. 2 (2001), available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/wg1/248.htm. See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies
and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (explaining that choosing a
common currency for environmental benefits trades can prove problematic). For a potent greenhouse gas
like HFC 23, a relatively small amount of reduction can generate a “carbon benefit” (i.e. reduced warming)
equal to a relatively large carbon dioxide reduction. For purposes of understanding the text’s hypothetical
problem, the reader should assume that both technological options deliver the same amount of carbon
dioxide equivalents. Also, this Article uses the term “carbon” in isolation to refer to carbon dioxide
equivalents.
7
See Karan Capoor & Philippe Ambrosi, State of the Carbon Market 2006 i (2006),
http://carbonfinance.org/docs/StateoftheCarbonMarket2006 (characterizing HFC projects as the “lowestcost options” and therefore becoming the “first asset class to be systematically tapped globally.”); Xingshu
Zhao & Axel Michaelowa, CDM Potential for Rural Transition in China Case Study: Options in Yinzhou
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Two overarching concepts tend to shape observers’ answers to this question. One
concept, that of market liberalism, tends to favor free global markets and the use of
economic principles developed to describe ideal markets.8 Another concept, that of
sustainable development, emphasizes adequately meeting the current generation’s basic
needs while protecting future generations.9
If we view emissions trading as a mechanism that happily marries sustainable
development and market liberalism we would assume that society should prefer HFC 23
control, the least cost option. This happy marriage view suggests that selection of a cost
effective solution is always a good outcome that provides for sustainable development
and allows the free market to work its magic.10
If we reject the happy marriage view, however, the choice of the HFC control
option appears problematic. We may believe that free markets tend to favor the current
generation’s interests over those of future generations, and that emissions trading markets
conform to this tendency. This HFC 23 comes from production of HCFC 22, an ozonedepleting substance used in refrigeration.11 The international community, including
India, has agreed to phase out HCFC 22 under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer.12 This HFC project promises a perfectly good greenhouse gas

District, Zhejiang Province, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1867, 1876 (2006) (finding the initial cost of solar
installation high, even though over the long term it is cost competitive).
8
See Douglas A. Kysar, Sustainable Development and Private Global Governance, 83
TEX. L. REV. 2109, 2116 (2005).
9
See WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT (WCED), OUR COMMON
FUTURE 8 (1987) (defining sustainable development as development meeting the current generation’s needs
without compromising future generations’ ability to meet their own needs).
10
See Baumert supra note 3, at 384 (explaining that the CDM encourages private sector
project development to seek out the least cost reductions); cf. David M. Driesen, Markets are Not Magic,
20 ENVTL FORUM 19 (Nov. - Dec. 2003) (discussing the “tendency to view the free market as a magical
solution environmental problems”).
11
See HFC PDD, supra note 4, at 8.
12
Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10 (1987), 1522 UNTS 3; see Menoj
Mehrota, Possible Alternative Approaches to Assessing the Baseline Scenario for Destruction of HFC 23 in
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emission reduction, which would help ameliorate future climate change. But it provides
a technological benefit that will only help the current generation, not future generations.13
This facility should shut down anyway at some point and HFC 23 control would lose all
value to society.14
The solar technology also reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but this reduction
could continue indefinitely15 (unlike the reduction in HFC 23, which only provides a real
additional benefit during the HCFC 22 plant’s short remaining life). Moreover,
deployment of an experimental solar option might contribute to solving the most
important long-term technological problem at the heart of climate change, how to run
advanced industrial economies without ever increasing fossil fuel use.16 For burning
fossil fuels creates carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas contributing to
global warming.17 Also, fossil fuel is a non-renewable resource, meaning that it will

the HCFC 22 Industry at 2, http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/inputam0001/ Comment_AM0001_
SRF_071004.pdf (noting that India has ratified the Montreal Protocol with its London and Beijing
Amendments and has passed implementing regulations addressing HCFC 22); see also Executive
Committee of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol, Country Program
Update, India at 3, UNEP/OzL.Pro/ExCom/49/37 (2006), http://www.multilateralfund.org/files/49/4937.pdf
(stating that HCFC 22 production has gone up in India even while India has phased out other ozone
depleters).
13
See Gerard Winn, U.N. Kyoto Chief Judges Climate Change Options, Reuters, May 30,
2006, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L30295511.htm (criticizing the HFC 23 reduction project
and stating that “the environmental benefits must be clear for future generations.”)
14
Cf. Othmar Schwank, Concerns About CDM Projects Based on Decomposition of HFC23 Emissions from HFC-23 Emissions from 22 HCFC Production Sites at 4 (2004), http://cdm.unfccc.int/
methodologies/inputam0001/Comment_AM0001_Schwank_081004.pdf (expressing a concern that
approval of CDM credits for emissions associated with HCFC 22 production may create an incentive to
delay phasing out this ozone depleting chemical). If one assumes that the carbon credits will create
sufficient incentives to keep the HCFC 22 plant open, then the decision to use this option creates a
continuing carbon benefit, but creates an ozone depletion cost. Either way, the net societal value of the
project may be less than a project that does not involve an ozone depleting production process.
15
See Winn, supra note 13 (recognizing renewable energy as creating “a stable structure”
for not emitting CO2).
16
See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 15 (2004) (explaining that
breakthroughs in solar technology could help enable a substitution of solar energy for fossil fuels at
reasonable cost).
17
See ID. (describing global warming as largely a product of fossil fuel combustion);
Richard B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Opportunities and Obstacles, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 228 (RICHARD L. REVESZ ET AL.
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eventually run out.18 If this solar experiment leads to technological developments
significantly reducing our reliance on fossil fuels, it may help improve the welfare of the
future generations that will need alternatives to finite fossil fuel resources. Thus, the cost
effective choice that the market favors may not coincide with the choice that sustainable
development considerations favor.
This Article examines the question of whether emissions trading marries market
liberalism and sustainable development. Douglas A. Kysar has correctly identified this
question of market liberalism’s compatibility with sustainable development as a key
question for global environmental governance.19 Indeed, responses to this question color
perceptions of most environmental and economic issues.20 Therefore, it is not surprising
that the relationship between free market and sustainable development ideals has
commanded scholars’ attention.21
Emissions trading helps shape perceptions of this relationship. Very few
neoliberals (market liberalism advocates) condemn government regulation altogether.22
Instead, most neoliberals support regulatory reforms that employ market concepts to

EDS. 2000) [hereinafter

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW] (characterizing carbon dioxide as “the most important”

greenhouse gas).
18

Cf. POSNER, supra note 16, at 59 (recognizing that fossil fuel resources are finite, but
arguing that they may not be finite relative to human demand because prices will rise when they become
scarce).
19
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2114-18 (discussing the rise of market liberalism and
international interest in sustainable development).
20
See generally Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness:
A Marriage of Marketplace Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2 (2005)
(discussing “the great divide” between scholars “using theories of welfare maximization derived from the
study of market[s]” and those more concerned about equity).
21
See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 2118-2147 (describing tensions between market
liberalism and sustainable development); WILLFRED BECKERMAN, A POVERTY OF REASON: SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH xii (2003) (an economist arguing that the sustainable development
ideal is not ethically superior to the “economist’s goal of maximizing the sum of human welfare over future
generations”); GEOFFREY HEAL, VALUING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC THEORY AND SUSTAINABILITY (1998);
HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABILITY (1996).
22
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2120 (noting that neoclassical economics does support some
regulation).
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shape environmental regulations.23 These reforms include wider use of cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) to determine environmental regulation’s goals and of emissions trading to
meet these goals.24 The international embrace of emissions trading under the Kyoto
Protocol suggests that emissions trading may qualify as the most widely accepted
neoliberal environmental reform.25 Hence, if a marriage exists anywhere, it should exist
in the realm of emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol.
This article claims that markets neglect positive “spillovers” associated with
technological choices, i.e. benefits that do not lead to increased rents for the firm making
the choice, which are crucial to sustainable development.

If introduction of a new solar

technology inspires technological advances by competitors, for example, this creates a
positive spillover. This article aim to show that positive spillovers are vital to addressing
global climate change and shine new light on our understanding of market liberalism,
sustainable development, and environmental law.
Part one of this Article provides needed background, introducing the concepts of
market liberalism and sustainable development, explaining emissions trading, and
providing a primer on the climate change regime. It emphasizes emissions trading’s role
in seeking to cement a union between sustainable development and market liberalism
ideals. The second part presents data on technological choices under the Kyoto Protocol,
like the choices our entrepreneur faces. The data raise questions about whether global

23

See Thomas O. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1492 (1996) (describing “economic efficiency” as the “guiding light” for “free
marketers”).
24
See id. at 1491-97 (explaining that “free marketeers” favor CBA and market-based
mechanisms); see, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 473 (2005) (arguments by
the American Enterprise Institute’s co-founders for CBA).
25
The term neoliberal describes a world view embracing broad reliance on global markets
and supporting economic concepts, i.e. the view embracing market liberalism. See Kysar, supra note 8, at
2116.
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emissions trading spurs technological innovation that aids sustainable development. The
third part uses the concept of positive spillovers to explore this data’s implications for
environmental law and for the relationship between sustainable development and market
liberalism.
II. EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A PRIMER
A. Market Liberalism and Sustainable Development
Market liberalism embraces free markets and a set of economic concepts that
provides ideological support for neoliberal reforms.26 The economic concepts generally
stem from efforts to describe, not justify, markets. But many of those employing these
concepts, especially in the law and economics movement, use them to justify marketbased solutions to problems.27 In general, economists tend to evaluate all policies and
decisions in terms of efficiency, and leading law and economics scholars, most
prominently, Richard Posner, have argued that efficiency constitutes an important goal
for government policy.28
While true devotees of free markets may prefer no regulation at all, most of those
employing economic concepts to justify markets recognize the need for some
regulation.29 Economists generally presume that markets are efficient only when they
generate no “externalities,” costs or benefits not reflected in prices.30 They characterize
the harms pollution causes as “negative externalities,” e.g. as costs not reflected in market
26

See id. at 2116 (identifying market liberalism with a “neoliberal political philosophy” and
“cultural exaltation of the market”).
27
See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 201 (claiming that economics is both normative and
positive).
28
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983); see also Louis Kaplow v.
Steven M. Shavell, Fairness v. Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).
29
See McGarity, supra note 23, at 1484-1513 (contrasting “radical anti-interventionists”
opposing nearly all government regulation with other neoliberal groups that support reformed regulation).
30
See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 552-53(1997).
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prices.31 They state that regulation and pollution taxes “internalize” costs associated
with environmental harms, by raising the market price of goods and services to reflect
their true environmental costs.32 Thus, economists regard regulation and pollution taxes
raising electricity prices, for example, to reflect their true environmental costs (i.e. a cost
associated with the harms they create) as efficient.33
This focus on efficiency tends to produce recommendations for two sets of
regulatory reforms. First, economists and their supporters tend to favor CBA’s use in
establishing environmental regulation’s goals.34 Such an approach requires policymakers to attempt to quantify environmental policies’ costs and benefits before
implementation.35 The costs of environmental policies come from expenditures to make
technological improvements, like those our entrepreneur contemplated.36 The benefits
include prevention of human deaths and illness and preservation of ecosystems.37
Economists define efficient regulations as those equating costs and benefits at the
margin.38 CBA proponents tend to favor quite comprehensive consideration of costs and
benefits in defining policy goals, including consideration of future costs and benefits.39

31

Id. at 553 (discussing economists’ characterization of harms from pollution as a cost
external to the market).
32
Id. (explaining that economists support regulating and or taxing pollution to internalize
pollution’s cost).
33
Id. at 577-78 (explaining the concept of an optimal, i.e. efficient, level of pollution as that
where the marginal benefits of control equal the marginal costs).
34
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2003)
(describing the “economics-based regulatory reform agenda” as including increased use of CBA).
35
See Driesen, supra note 30, at 558 (explaining that CBA requires the comparison of
pollution control costs with “costs” consisting of environmental and health effects).
36
See David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight: One Strand of the Regulatory
Reform Debate, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 10003, 10019 n. 204 (2001)
37
See Driesen, supra note 30, at 558-59 (noting the difficulty of quantifying these benefits).
38
Id. at 582-83; see WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 23 (1975).
39
See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5 (1996) (characterizing CBA as supporting "comprehensive
analytical rationality").
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Whether or not policymakers employ CBA in setting environmental goals,
moderate neoliberals tend to favor using “market-based mechanisms,” principally
emissions trading and environmental taxation, to achieve these goals.40 These
mechanisms encourage efficiency in a different sense, the selection of least cost
technological options for achieving any given environmental goal.41 This framework
implies that private actors, like our Indian entrepreneur, will make their own choices
about how to achieve a defined government goal, such as a target for carbon dioxide
reduction, free of government influence. Thus, market liberalism tends to leave
technological choice to quite narrow private decision-making focusing on cost effective
achievement of a government specified environmental goal.
Market liberalism also embraces free trade, the original efficiency enhancing
reform.42 This free trade emphasis tends to lead market liberals to favor not just
emissions trading, but free global trading markets, where credits may be traded across
industries and between countries. Global trading markets enhance opportunities for
cheap emission reductions; thereby lowering environmental protection’s cost.43
Sustainable development, by contrast, generally focuses on adequately meeting
the current generation’s basic needs without impairing future generations’ ability to meet

40

See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 1 (discussing use of “economic incentive” measures to
meet environmental goals as part of the “economics-based regulatory reform agenda”).
41
See Driesen, supra note 30, at 564-65 (explaining the difference between allocatively
efficient goal selection and selection of cost effective means of meeting chosen goals).
42
See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade
and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 287-291 (2001) (describing free trade’s classical origins
and explaining that modern economists “employ an allocative efficiency test” in thinking about free trade).
43
See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L. J. 677, 748 (1999) (explaining that widening participation in emissions trading
to include developing countries reduces abatement costs).
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their own needs.44 It reflects some skepticism of the idea that free market actors choose
developmental paths that adequately address either poverty or future generations’ needs.
The concept originated in efforts to bridge differences between developing and developed
countries on international law and numerous international agreements embrace
sustainable development as a goal.45 Definitions of the concept vary and many scholars
lament its lack of precision.46 Scholars studying sustainable development refer to the
consideration of future generations’ needs under the rubric of intergenerational equity.47
Sustainable development involves an emphasis on integrated planning and public
participation.48 This emphasis arises from a distinctive view of the relationship between
economic development and environmental protection. The report often credited with
creating the sustainable development concept, the Brundtland Report, claims that
environmental degradation often impedes economic development and, conversely, that

44

WCED, supra note 9, at 8. I have not attempted to provide a comprehensive account of
sustainable development’s elements here, but instead focus on the components most relevant to this
Article’s thesis. Cf. John Martin Gillroy, Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes and
International Tribunals: The Status of “Environmental Sustainability” in International Jurisprudence, 42
STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 12 (2006) (identifying eight sustainable development “sub-principles”).
45
MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 15 (2004) (discussing sustainable development’s origins as
a “compromise” term); PHILIPPE SANDS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
252 (2003) (stating that the term sustainable development now appears regularly in international
environmental instruments).
46
See, e.g., BECKERMAN, supra note 21, at xi ; SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 4
(explaining that the vagueness of the sustainable development concept helped it gain universal acceptance,
but creates “difficulties”).
47
See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 2118.
48
See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development: Now More than Ever, in STUMBLING
TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 51-53, 56 (John C. Dernbach ed. 2002) [hereinafter STUMBLING]; SEGGER &
KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 3 (explaining that sustainable development seeks to encourage integrated
solutions to our most important problems by requiring “accommodation of between economic
development, social justice, and environmental protection through a process requiring public participation);
SANDS, supra note 45, at 263 (discussing integration of environment and development as an “element” of
sustainable development); United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992,
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev. 1, princ. 4 (June 16,
1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (stating that achievement of sustainable development requires the integration of
environmental and developmental concerns).
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poverty frequently causes environmental degradation.49 This view suggests that proper
economic development choices will simultaneously protect the environment and aid
poverty elimination and leads to support for governance reforms integrating economic
development and environmental decision-making.50 This view of environmental policy
and economic development as complimentary contrasts with market liberalism’s
perspective, which tends to view environmental protection as in conflict with economic
development, leading to a desire to carefully consider tradeoffs between them and reduce
environmental protection’s cost. Sustainable development implies a significant role for
collective decision-making, presumably including government.51
B. Understanding Emissions Trading
Environmental law has traditionally relied heavily upon uniform performance
standards as a means of meeting environmental goals.52 Such standards generally require
all parts of an industry to achieve a numerically specified emission reduction target.53
Economists have criticized this uniform standards approach as inconsistent with
the free market ideal of economic efficiency.54 Facilities have widely varying control
49

WCED, supra note 9, at 3.
ID. at 8-11 (affirming that it is possible to make development sustainable and then
explaining how this requires broadening the mandates of economic development and environmental
ministries to allow for integrated consideration of the environment and economic development).
51
See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2147 (discussing sustainable development proponents’
argument for collective decision-making).
52
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) (explaining that environmental law relies heavily upon uniform standards for
industrial categories); cf. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Beyond the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 308 n. 93
(1998) (arguing that commentators have exaggerated the extent of the uniform standard approach’s use);
Driesen, supra note 3, at 36-37 (noting that the Kyoto Protocol does not impose uniform standards upon
countries, but explaining why emissions trading increases cost effectiveness anyway); see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §
1312 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a), 7412(d), 7521 (2000).
53
See Jason Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, in MOVING
TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LESSONS FROM 20 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 358 (Jody
Freeman and Charles Kolstad eds., 2007) [hereinafter MOVING TO MARKETS] (federal environmental
regulations require uniform emission reductions for facilities of the same approximate age in an industry
category).
50
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costs. Accordingly, facilities can achieve any aggregate target more cheaply than a
uniform standard allows, if facilities with relatively cheap control costs make more of the
aggregate reductions than facilities with high control costs.55 Emissions trading
ingeniously corrects traditional government regulation’s failure to generate the costeffective outcomes hypothesized for an ideal free market.56 The regulator can set the
same limits as would undergird a traditional regulation, but allow facility owners to buy
emission reduction credits from over-complying facilities in lieu of local reductions.
This opportunity will encourage facility owners with cheap pollution control options to
provide extra emission reductions, because they can sell credits representing the excess
reductions to facility owners facing relatively expensive control options.57 Conversely,
owners of facilities generating high control costs will avoid making reductions at their
own facilities, and purchase credits from operators of facilities with low cost reduction
options instead.58 Thus, emissions trading encourages a cost effective shift of reductions
from high to low cost facilities.59

54

See id. at __ (“command and control” regulation has been “widely decried as

inefficient”).
55

Unfortunately, regulators rarely have sufficient marginal cost information to tailor
regulation to each facility’s marginal control cost. Cf. EMISSIONS TRADING FOR CLIMATE POLICY: U.S.
AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES at 3 (Bernd Hansjürgens, ed. 2005) [hereinafter EMISSIONS TRADING]
(explaining that regulators could tailor standards to each firm’s marginal abatement cost).
56
I use the term “traditional regulation” to refer to performance standards, which require a
particular pollution source to meet a quantitative limit for pollution outputs, and work practice standards,
which dictate use of a particular technology or practice. Some writers use the term “command and control”
regulation in the same way. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 297, n.44. I eschew use of this term, because it
is misleadingly suggests that performance standards dictate technological choices or that work practice
standards dominate environmental law. Id. at 296-302.
57
See Geoffrey Bertram, Tradable Emissions Permits and Control of Greenhouse Gases,
28 J. DEV. STUD. 423, 425 (1992).
58
Id.
59
Stewart, supra note 17, at 190 (describing trading as “automatically transferring”
resources from high cost to low cost sources); see Driesen, supra note 3, at 36 (illustrating trading’s
encouragement of cost effective reduction shifts with a numerical example).
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The United States enjoyed its first major success with this “market-based
approach” in the acid rain program enacted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.60 Congress assigned emission limits to each electric utility unit generating
sulfur dioxide, a major contributor to acid rain.61 But Congress allowed electric utility
operators to purchase extra emission reductions realized at other capped generating units
in lieu of local compliance.62 The program produced significant aggregate sulfur dioxide
reductions at much lower cost than regulators had anticipated, precisely what the market
liberalism model predicts.63 Since then, environmental benefit trading has taken off,
becoming the most ubiquitous approach to meeting environmental standards in the
United States.64
C. Emissions Trading in the Climate Change Regime
Meanwhile, scientific evidence mounted that greenhouse gases, especially carbon
dioxide, a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, had warmed the earth’s average mean
surface temperature and would likely increase warming in the future.65 Recent scientific

60

42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000). See Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral
Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Market, 62 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 125, 129 (2006) (calling the
acid rain program “a success by any measure”); Byron Swift, Command Without Control: Why Cap-andTrade Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10330,
10331-32 (2001) (explaining that the acid rain program produced early reductions and cheaper than
expected costs); Driesen, supra note 52, at 314-17 & n. 131 (reviewing the history of trading prior to 1990).
61
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c(e); 7651d (2000).
62
42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (2000).
63
See Choi, supra note 5, at 890 (conceding, in the context of a fairly critical appraisal, that
the acid rain program has achieved its goals); Swift, supra note 61, at 10331-32 (discussing the reductions
and cost savings).
64
See Choi, supra note 5, at 892-94 (claiming that trading has been used frequently in the
U.S. and providing examples). While other emissions trading programs have failed because of monitoring
and tracking difficulties, this Article will assume, perhaps unwisely, that the Kyoto trading programs will
produce real emission reductions as planned. See id. at 932-933 (explaining that the European Emissions
Trading scheme does not require continuous emissions monitors in all cases). This assumption, whether
realistic or not, makes it easier to address the Article’s chief theoretical concern, the relationship between
market liberalism and sustainable development.
65
See Zachary Tyler, Massachusetts v. EPA: The D.C. Circuit’s Failure to Extend the
Clean Air Act to Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10456, 10457 (2006)
(explaining the link between fossil fuel combustion and carbon dioxide); DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1,
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papers show that global warming has already begun melting glaciers,66 raising sea
levels,67 and intensifying hurricanes68. But the scientific literature raises even more
concerns about what future generations might face, if the current generation does not
safeguard their welfare. The literature predicts that rising sea levels will inundate coastal
areas and small island states.69 It predicts more violent future weather events, droughts in
areas where many people already suffer from malnutrition, and the proliferation of
tropical diseases in areas where they have hitherto afflicted nobody.70 Global warming
may also lead to rapid ecological changes accelerating many species’ extinction.71
The international community responded to the mounting scientific evidence that
human activities seriously disrupt the global climate by enacting the United Nations

at 8-10 (explaining that carbon dioxide and water vapor are the principal greenhouse gases and that by the
1980s evidence had mounted that temperatures were warming).
66
GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (WGBU), THE FUTURE
OCEANS – WARMING UP, RISING HIGH, TURNING SOURCE: SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS 2 (2006)
(citing “indications that the continental ice sheets on Greenland and in the Antarctic are beginning to
disintegrate.”).
67
ID. at 1 (that that “the sea level is rising ever faster”); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) WORKING GROUP I, supra note 6, at 4 (finding that sea levels have risen by four
to eight inches over the last 100 years).
68
Kerri Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years,
436 NATURE 686 (2005) (showing a correlation between the increased destructiveness of tropical cyclones
and average mean surface temperature); WGBU, supra note 43, at 2 (stating that both “observed data” and
mathematical models show that global warming boosts hurricanes’ “destructive energy.”). See generally
DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 83 (explaining that because the strength of tropical cyclones depends
on sea surface temperatures, “there is a good basis” to expect more intense hurricanes and typhoons).
69
IPCC WORKING GROUP II, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY, at sec. 19.3.4.1 (2001) (discussing the vulnerability of Antigua, the Cook Islands, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu);
WGBU, supra note 43, at 2 (“Sea-level rise will lead to inundation of coasts and small island states. . .”).
70
ID. at 5-6, 12, 489.
71
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE 84-85 (2006) (reporting
biologists’ preliminary estimate of species extinction as between 15% and 37%); Note, Ratification of
Kyoto Aside: How International Law and Market Uncertainty Obviate the Current U.S. Approach to
Climate Change Emissions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2089, 2093 (2006) [hereinafter Ratification Aside]
(discussing studies predicting “devastating consequences” for polar bears and certain seals); IPCC
WORKING GROUP II, supra note 46, at 19.2.2.2.
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention) in 1992.72 The
Framework Convention reflects both international support for the sustainable
development ideal and market liberalism’s ascendancy.
The Framework Convention proclaims that “the Parties . . . should . . . promote
sustainable development”73 and “protect the climate system for the benefit of future
generations. . .”74 This proclamation is consistent with the intergenerational concerns at
the heart of sustainable development.75 The Framework Convention’s general goal more
concretely expresses sustainable development’s possible meaning in this context by
declaring an “ultimate objective” of stabilizing “greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. . .”76
The Framework Convention simultaneously embraces market liberalism by
stating that “policies and measures should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits
at the lowest possible cost.”77 Employing the language of neoliberal CBA proponents
this clause refers to measures reducing greenhouse gas emissions not as avoiding harm,
but as ensuring “benefits.”78 At the same time, this language suggests the need for
emissions trading by establishing cost-effectiveness as a major objective of the climate

72

May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter FCCC]. See
generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451 (1993).
73
FCCC, supra note 72, art. 3(4).
74
Id., art. 3(1).
75
See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERNATIONAL EQUITY (1989).
76
FCCC, supra note 72, art. 2.
77
Id.
78
Cf. Driesen, supra note 30, at 560-61 & n. 67 (pointing out that cost-benefit proponents’
use the word “benefits” to describe averted harms).
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change regime.79 This language did not enter the agreement by accident. The United
States, a leading bastion of market liberalism, resisted mandatory emission reduction
targets, partially because it considered their achievement too costly.80 United States
negotiators also argued that liberal international emissions trading should become part of
the agreement.81 This position created a tension between the United States and countries
more interested in binding limits and skeptical of emissions trading.82 This tension led to
a clause establishing an “aim of returning individually or jointly to . . . 1990” developed
country greenhouse gas emission levels.83

This language established an emission

reduction goal in lieu of an emission reduction requirement.84 And the reference to joint
achievement of the stabilization “aim” suggests using international emissions trading to
achieve this goal.85
The United States continued its emissions trading advocacy and its opposition to
binding emission reduction targets during the meetings that produced the Kyoto

79

See SANDS, supra note 45, at 365-66 (linking the joint implementation provision to the
Framework Convention’s language on cost effectiveness); Driesen, supra note 3, at 15-18 (explaining that
the language surrounding the cost effectiveness principle seems to qualify it, but that “cost effectiveness
concerns have tended to dominate debates about implementation of the Climate Change Convention.”).
80
SANDS, supra note 45, at 360 (stating that the United States publicly opposed specific
targets and timetables for greenhouse gas emission reductions); James A. Beard, An Application of the
Principles of Sustainability to the Problem of Global Climate Change: An Argument for Integrated Energy
Services, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT. 191, 203 (1996) (discussing the U.S. effort to defeat a proposal for a 20%
emissions cut).
81
See Ratification Aside, supra note 71, at 2101 (attributing the inclusion of some trading
provisions to “U.S. pressure”).
82
See SANDS, supra note 45, at 365 (pointing out that the European Union and other
countries supported a clear commitment to stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels).
83
FCCC, supra note 72, art. 4(2)(b); see PRUE TAYLOR, AN ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1998) (describing this compromise as a “watering down of obligations”
achieved through a U.S. threat to boycott the talks).
84
See Bodansky, supra note 72, at 515-17 (describing this clause as establishing a “quasitarget”).
85
See Driesen, supra note 3, at 28 (explaining that the “joint implementation” language
suggests authorization of trading, but could also be interpreted as contemplating one country helping
another achieve reductions without credit sales).
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Protocol.86 This placed the United States in tension with the EU, which supported strict
targets and less use of trading.87 Then Vice-President Al Gore helped break an impasse
that threatened to scuttle a Kyoto agreement, by signaling the United States’ willingness
to accept modest binding emission reduction targets in exchange for a liberal
international emissions trading regime.88 The resulting Kyoto Protocol generally
obligates advanced industrialized countries to deliver emission reductions representing a
5% cut below their joint 1990 emission levels, but allowed them to substitute carbon
credits generated abroad for some of these cuts. 89
The Kyoto Protocol provides for no less than three international emission trading
programs, usually referred to as the Kyoto “flexibility mechanisms,” as a means of
achieving the reduction targets for individual countries.90 Article 17 authorizes trades of
national allowances among the developed countries that assumed reduction obligations

86

See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the Clinton Administration’s
initial reluctance to accept mandatory emission reductions).
87
See ID. at 15 (describing the tension between the U.S. and EU on the liberality of
trading); Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading: Navigating Between Scylla and
Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 2 (2005) (noting that the EU opposed international trading in the “run-up”
to the Kyoto conference).
88
See Joby Warrick, Gore Urges Resolution at Climate Talks; With Summit in Disarray,
Vice-President Prods U.S. Negotiators to Bridge Gaps, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at A1 (describing the
U.S. compromise accepting a 7% reduction target); James H. Searles, Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol to the
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, 21 INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998)
(U.S. demanded emissions trading in exchange for legally binding emissions reductions).
89
See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 3(1) (requiring industrialized countries to reduce
their emissions by the amounts assigned in annex B “with a view to reducing their overall emissions by at
least 5 per cent below 1990 levels.”); Kyoto Parties End Meetings With Consensus for Avoiding Gap in
Post-2012 Reductions, 37 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1154 (2006) (explaining that “The Kyoto Protocol . . .
requires 36 industrialized countries . . . to collectively reduce carbon dioxide emissions about 5 percent
below 1990 levels. . .”).
90
See LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS 175 (David
Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds. 2005) [hereinafter, KYOTO MECHANISMS] (introducing Joint
Implementation, Emissions Trading, and the Clean Development Mechanism as the three “market-oriented
mechanisms” provided for in the Kyoto Protocol); SANDS, supra note 45, at 372 (listing the flexibility
mechanisms as “emissions trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism”); cf.
Stewart, supra note 17, at 238 (interpreting the Kyoto Protocol as providing four different economic
incentive systems).
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under the Kyoto Protocol.91 Article 6, the joint implementation provision, authorizes
project-based trades among developed countries or among private parties within
developed countries.92 Article 12 establishes a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
that authorizes developed countries, or private companies within developed countries, to
purchase credits from projects in developing countries, even though developing countries
have assumed no emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.93 The CDM’s
“purpose is to assist” developing countries in “achieving sustainable development.”94
In order to meet CDM’s sustainable development goals, the parties to the Kyoto
Protocol established a process for public participation and collective decision-making in
choosing CDM projects.95 This process requires “designated operational authorities”
(often a private consulting firm paid for by project developers) to provide for public
comment on proposed projects, estimate emission reductions, and validate the subsequent
emissions. 96 A designated national authority within the country hosting the project
reviews the project for compatibility with sustainable development goals.97 An
international executive board reviews credit estimation techniques and exercises
oversight.98

91

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 17.
Id. art. 6.
93
Id. art. 12.
94
Id. art. 12(2). The CDM also aims to contribute to achieving the Framework
Convention’s objective of avoiding dangerous climate change and assisting developed countries in
complying with their emission reduction obligations. Id.
95
See KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra note 90, at 71-104.
96
See ID. at 198-202 (describing the role of designated operational authorities).
97
See ID. at 213-219 (explaining that the role of the designated national authority includes
review for sustainability).
98
ID. at 202 (stating that the executive board reviews projects for environmental integrity).
92

18

D. Implementation
President George W. Bush renounced the Kyoto Protocol shortly after coming
into office, thereby depriving the climate change regime of support from the world’s
largest greenhouse gas emitter.99 In spite of this setback, the Kyoto Protocol entered into
force in 2005, and most of world’s developed countries have begun to implement it.100
Thanks to the United States federal government’s absence,101 the EU and its
member states have become the most important actors in shaping Kyoto
implementation102. The EU has used a variety of approaches to meeting its Kyoto targets.
1. The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme
As we saw, the EU reluctantly accepted a global trading regime in the hopes of
obtaining reductions from the United States in return. Even though the effort to combine
market liberalism and sustainable development under the Kyoto canopy attempts

99

See ID. at 370 (stating that Bush’s repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol in early 2001 threw
the Protocol into doubt, because the U.S. emits about a quarter of the world’s greenhouse gases);
Transcript, Bush Press Conference at the White House, March 29, 2001,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329.html (explaining President Bush’s concerns
about cost and the ineffectiveness of the agreement); see also S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted)
(disapproving of climate change agreements that do not mandate developing country emission reductions
and expressing cost concerns).
100
See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that the Kyoto Protocol entered into
force on February 16, 2005).
101
See Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 54, 55 (2005) (noting “the absence of the federal government’s
participation in the Kyoto Protocol”); Kirsten H. Engel and Scott R. Saleska, The Subglobal Regulation of
the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L. Q. 183, 186 (2005) (pointing out that
the United States federal government has “eschewed substantive regulation”); cf. Deborah Keeth, The
California Climate Law: A State’s Cutting Edge Efforts to Achieve Clean Air, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 715
(2003) (discussing California climate change law); Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 267, 273 (2004) (describing
the Bush Administration’s plan to address climate change without meeting Kyoto targets).
102
See Choi, supra note 5, at 952 (stating that the European Emissions Trading Scheme
“will provide important lessons to the rest of the world,” including the U.S.).
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something of a shotgun marriage,103 the EU moved rapidly to adopt a trading scheme
after it signed the Kyoto accord104.
The European Parliament adopted a two-phased trading program requiring
individual countries to establish limits for the carbon dioxide emissions of listed major
industrial sources, such as power plants.105 This trading program, however, does not
confine itself to trades between capped sources in Europe. It allows regulated European
polluters to purchase credits generated by projects approved under the Kyoto Protocol’s
CDM and Joint Implementation provisions to satisfy part of their compliance
obligations.106 The European Parliament adopted this global liberalization of the trading
regime specifically to advance the sustainable development goal by facilitating resource
transfers to developing countries and to further the cost effectiveness goal by increasing
the availability of cheap credits.107 Thus, the EU embraced, to a remarkable degree, the
marriage of sustainable development and market liberalism, even though the country
seeking the marriage, the United States, had absconded.108

103

Michael A. Mehling, Emissions trading and National Allocation in the Member States-An
Achilles’ Heel of European Climate Policy, 5 Y.B. EUR. ENVTL. L. 113, 118-19 (2005) (describing
emissions trading as something “largely adopted in response” to U.S. “pressure”).
104
Id. at 123, 127 (describing EU decision to adopt trading after “notoriously” opposing it as
a “remarkable shift” and noting that it moved from proposal to adoption in “less than four years.”).
105
See Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275); Rie Watanabe & Guy Robinson, The
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 CLIMATE CHANGE 10 (2005) (explaining the particulars of
the scheme); B. Mortensen, The EU Emissions Trading Directive, 14 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2004).
106
See Council Directive 2004/101/, preamble, 2004 O.J. (L 338), 18, 18 [hereinafter
Linking Directive]; Watanabe & Robinson, supra note 106, at 13.
107
See Linking Directive, supra note 106 (preamble).
108
Accord Reimund Schwarze, Incentives to Adopt New Abatement Technology and USEuropean Regulatory Cultures, in, EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 55, at 58 (likening the EU to a hesitant
bride expecting a baby after the father has left).

20

2. Alternatives to Global Trading
The EU, however, has not relied upon global trading as the sole means of meeting
its Kyoto goals.109 The EU has established targets for increased use of renewable
energy.110 Member countries have sought to achieve these targets primarily through two
energy regulatory mechanisms, often coupled with some form of tax incentive. Many
countries (and many states in the United States) employ renewable energy portfolio
standards that usually require electric utilities to obtain a fixed percentage of their energy
from renewable sources.111 Typically, a renewable portfolio standard allows an
electricity retailer to comply by using renewable energy from a facility it owns,
purchasing power from somebody else’s renewable energy facility, or by buying a

109

Mehling, supra note 103, at 121-22 (describing legislation on energy efficiency,
renewable energy, energy taxation, funding and promotion schemes, voluntary agreements with industry,
and monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions as following in the wake of a Europe Commission decision to
make climate change a priority in 1992).
110
Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document: The
Share of Renewable Energy in the EU: Country Profiles Overview of Renewable Energy Sources in the
Enlarged European Union, SEC (2004) 547 (discussing EU target of a 12% share of renewable energy
consumption by 2010); Commission of the European Communities, The Share of Renewable Energy in the
EU: Commission Report in Accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2001/77/EC, Evaluation of the Effect
of Legislative Instruments and Other Community Policies on the Development of the Contribution of
Renewable Energy Resources in the EU and Proposals for Concrete Actions, SEC(2004) 547, at 11
[hereinafter 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation] (discussing an “indicative target” of 22% renewable
electricity generation by 2010 for the EU 15).
111
Kevin S. Golden, Senate Bill 1078: The Renewable Portfolio Standard: California
Asserts its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 693, 699 (2003) (describing renewable energy
portfolio standards as requirements that “retail electricity sellers” include “a determined percentage of
renewable energy sources” in their “resource portfolios.”); Barry G. Rabe, Race to the Top: The
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards 3-4 (2006) (listing states and countries that
have adopted renewable portfolio standards); Andrew Ford et al., Stimulating Price Patterns for Tradable
Green Certificates to Promote Electricity Generation from Wind, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 91, 92-94 (2007)
(describing state programs and mentioning the European countries employing similar programs);
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: The Support of
Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources, COM(2005) 627, at 4-5 [hereinafter Renewables Support]
(listing countries employing green certificate systems, which can be a form of renewable portfolio
standards); see also Espey, supra note 5, at 560 (explaining that the term renewable portfolio standard
comes from U.S. practice, but that other countries employ different names to describe similar programs).
See generally Nancy Rader & Scott Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: A Practical Guide
(2001).
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renewable energy credit.112 In Europe, even more countries have used feed-in tariffs,
which require electricity providers to pay renewable energy providers a fixed abovemarket price for their energy.113 This approach relies on an economic incentive as a
means of meeting a goal for technological change. But it relies on a “distortion” of the
“natural market” - basically government price fixing - to achieve sustainable
development goals.114 Thus, Europe has employed both feed-in tariffs (a price
mechanism) and production quotas (a quantity mechanism) to encourage renewable
energy.115

112

Golden, supra note 111, at 699-700. Cf. Engel, supra note 5, at 268 n. 72 (only one state,
Arizona, currently uses tradable renewable power credits); Ford et al., supra note 111, at 94 (characterizing
green certificates as quite new); Espey, supra note 5, at 557 (describing “certificates” as a means of proving
compliance with a renewable portfolio standard). Espey further explains that the certificate system allows
a utility to participate in financing renewable energy without acquiring a production facility or obtaining
the renewable power, for a utility can acquire a certificate without acquiring the underlying power. Id. at
560. This separation can both simplify enforcement and provide flexibility for those complying with a
renewables portfolio obligation. See Rader & Hempling, supra note 111, at 55-71 (discussing trading’s
potential uses). While the green certificates have a number of advantages, the evidence suggests that the
quotas themselves, not the trading, have spurred the technological development. See, e.g., M.H. van der
Linden et. al., Review of International Experience With Renewable Energy Obligations Support
Mechanisms (LBNL-57666) at 49 (2005) (suppliers usually purchase tradable renewable energy credits
from suppliers of renewable energy in order to meet their own compliance obligations); Ryan Wiser & Ole
Langniss, The Renewables Portfolio standard in Texas: An Early Assessment (2001),
http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP 15 (stating that certificate trades “may not be essential” to effective design of a
renewable portfolio standard).
113
Renewables Support, supra note 111, at 4 (most EU member states employ feed-in
tariffs); Karen Palmer & Dallas Burtraw, Electricity, Renewables, and Climate Change: Searching for a
Cost-Effective Policy, 8-9 (2004), http://www.rff.org (discussing feed-in tariffs’ use in several European
countries). Feed-in tariffs constitute a subsidy and as such bear some similarity to the “Federal Production
Tax” credit. See Ford et al., supra note 111, at 94 n. 12.
114
See Renewable Energy Certificates System International, The Use of Guarantees of
Origin 24 (2005), http://www.recs.org/doctree/RECS%20International/05%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf
(explaining that a fixed feed-in tariff introduces a “market distortion.”)
115
See Lene Nielsen & Tim Jeppesen, Tradable Green Certificates in Selected European
Countries_ Overview and Assessment, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 3, 5 (2003) (all countries planning green
certificate program except the Netherlands “envisage . . . politically determined demand”); van der Linden
et. al., supra note 112, at 11-12 (discussing feed-in tariffs, a tendering system where the government
contracts for renewable power, financial incentives, and tax incentives); Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 113,
at 3 (discussing state subsidies and funded by a surcharge on electricity purchases and federal renewable
energy production tax credits). See generally Wiener, supra note 43, at 706-713 (developing the distinction
between price and quantity instruments with examples).
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The European Commission has also proposed shifting transport taxation to focus
on carbon.116 While the European Parliament has not yet adopted this reform, several
member states have employed relevant green taxes.117
3. The Emerging U.S. Program
While the United States has not yet agreed to Kyoto targets, several states have
moved forward with programs addressing greenhouse gas emissions.118 These programs,
like their European counterparts, involve a mixture of emissions trading and other
approaches.119 And pending federal legislation relies heavily on emissions trading.
This Article cannot catalogue all developed country efforts to meet Kyoto targets.
But this brief description of a few key programs illustrates an important predicate for
subsequent discussion, that most countries have combined global emissions trading with
other more targeted approaches.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
Our Indian entrepreneur is not alone in making technological choices. Other
credit generators must decide between projects generating renewable energy (like the
solar project), projects employing end-of-the-pipe approaches (like the HFC 23 project),
and projects enhancing energy efficiency (which indirectly reduce carbon dioxide

116

Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive on
Passenger Related Taxes, COM(2005)261 Final, at 7-8, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/co2/pdf/taxation_com_2005_261.pdf.
117
See David M. Driesen, Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A CRITICAL READER 295 (Stepan Wood, Benjamin J.
Richardson eds. 2006) (discussing taxes touted as carbon taxes in several European countries); Choi, supra
note 5, at 896-97 (discussing “green taxes” in the European energy sector).
118
See generally, Engel, supra note 101, at 54 (describing state and local government as
“taking the lead in addressing global climate change.”); Engel & Saleska, supra note 101, at 185 (stating
that “at least half the states” have passed legislation addressing global warming); BARRY RABE,
STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004).
119
See Engel, supra note 101, at 65-68 (discussing various regional initiatives); Engel &
Saleska, supra note 101, at 212-13 (discussing vehicle emission standards and renewable energy
programs).
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emissions). Also, private actors make technological changes in responding to renewable
portfolio standards and other measures aimed at stimulating greenhouse gas emission
reductions. What sorts of choices have people made under the Kyoto Protocol?
A. Technological Choices Generated by Global Emissions Trading
A survey of technological responses to the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based
mechanisms suggests that those in our Indian entrepreneur’s position have made a variety
of choices. A quick glance at the projects list might suggest that renewable energy
projects have dominated, since they constitute the majority of projects.120
But a more careful analysis suggests much more emphasis on end-of-the-pipe
approaches than on renewable energy or energy efficiency. End-of-the-pipe approaches
have generated the lion’s share of credits available in the market.121 End-of-the-pipe
technologies received most of the funding available for credit generating projects, with
HFC control projects alone, like the project our entrepreneur contemplated, garnering
58% of the $2.5 billion invested in CDM projects in 2005.122
The chart below reflects the distribution of credits sold in 2005 and early 2006
under the Kyoto Protocol’s project-based trading mechanisms (CDM and Joint
Implementation).123 It shows end-of-the-pipe controls’ predominance and relatively little
production of renewable energy

120

Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 33 (stating that 51% of the projects generating
transactions have involved energy efficiency or renewable energy).
121
See Baumert, supra note 3, at 386 (noting that gas capture/destruction projects account
for 66 percent of expected emission reduction credits); Michael Wara, Is the Global Carbon Market
Working?, 445 NATURE 595, 596 (2007) (showing that waste gas projects account for the majority of credits
claimed for projects “in the pipeline”).
122
See Robin Lancaster, Beyond All Expectation, 3 CARBON FIN. 15 (May 2006) (stating that
HFC23 reductions accounted for 58% of the market volume between January 2005 and March 2006).
123
See Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 9, 32-33 (explaining that the data comes from
signed contracts and presenting figures from January of 2005 through March of 2006).
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credits.124

Distribution of Project Credits:
Transactions from January 2005 to March 2006
Renewables, 10%
Energy Efficiency, 2%
Other, 27%

End-Of-The-Pipe, 61%

If one examines somewhat less reliable numbers for projects “in the pipeline” (i.e. not yet
fully-approved) for CDM only, renewable energy credits rise to about 17%.125 The
124

I have derived this chart from the chart at the top of page 32 of the Capoor & Ambrosi
report. See Capoor & Ambrosi, supra note 7, at 32 (presenting more disaggregated data, including
percentages of credits for different types of renewable energy sources). On the next page of text, the
Capoor & Ambrosi estimate that renewables and energy efficiency constitute 10% of the total by credits
generated. Id. at 33. This suggests that some of the energy efficiency projects may be combined with
renewable energy projects, since the chart shows 10% renewables and 2% efficiency projects, suggesting
an aggregated total of 12%. The “other” category in my chart denotes technologies that are not known to
involve end-of-the-pipe, renewable efficiency, or energy efficiency technologies. The “other” category
includes some projects that might be properly viewed as “end-of-the-pipe” projects, so that the percentage
of end-of-the-pipe credits may be understated. The finding that renewables projects generate a small
percentage of the total credits is broadly consistent with other analysts’ conclusions. See, e.g., Ben
Pearson, CDM is Failing, 56 TIEMPO 12, 12 (2005), available at http://www.tiempocyberclimate.org/
portal/archive/pdf/tiempo56high.pdf (stating that renewables projects have generated just 11% of the total
credits); CDM Watch, The World Bank and the Carbon Market: Rhetoric and Reality, http://www.
cdmwatch.org/files/World%20Bank%20paper%20final.pdf, at 16 (noting that renewables projects
generated about 11% of CDM credits through April of 2005).
125
See Jane Ellis & Katia Karousakis, The Developing CDM Market: May 2006 Update 6-7
(2006), http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,2340,en_2649_34361_1943164_1_1_1_1,00.html (discussing
projects “in the pipeline” and then concluding that renewables are expected to generate 17% of the CDM
credits). This number represents a decline in the amount of renewable energy in the pipeline. Id. at 7.
Furthermore, renewables project developers may face greater risks than developers of cheaper projects of
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Kyoto mechanisms have stimulated even less energy efficiency credits than renewable
energy credits, since energy efficiency projects have generated just 2% of the total
credits.
Sustainable development advocates have used the public participation provisions
in project approval processes to oppose projects promising no additional carbon benefit
and to address broader concerns about some projects’ collateral consequences for poor
people in host countries. For example, they have expressed concerns about ecological
destruction and chemical contamination associated with a eucalyptus plantation
generating carbon displacing biofuel and providing incentives to keep a landfill slated for
closure open in order to allow methane capture for credit.126 The CDM Executive Board
has sometimes revised or rejected emission estimates on the grounds that they exaggerate
the carbon benefits or involve no additional carbon benefit from baseline conditions.127
But public participation aimed at furthering sustainable development has not reversed the
market trend favoring end-of-the-pipe control.128

having their projects emission credits disapproved or reduced. See Lucy Mortimer, An Uncertain Path, 3
CARBON FIN. 14 (April, 2006), available at http://www.carbon-financeonline.com (noting that many
projects may not make it through the registration process because of financial problems, methodological
problems, and uncertainty about the post-2012 carbon market); CDM Watch, supra note 124, at 16 (noting
that many renewables projects may not meet the Kyoto Protocol’s “additionality” criterion).
126
See, e.g., Jim Vallette et al., A Wrong Turn from Rio: The World Bank’s Road to
Climate Change Catastrophe 9-10 (2004), http://www.seen.org (describing these projects and their effects);
CDM Watch, supra note 124, at 11 (discussing a methane project in South Africa that might discourage the
government from fulfilling its promise to close a landfill sited in a poor community under apartheid). I am
reporting here the sustainable development group’s characterization of the effects, which I have not
independently evaluated. Cf. The World Bank Carbon Finance Unit, Brazil: Plantar Sequestration and
Biomass Use (2006), http://carbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=Projport&ProjID=9600#DocsList
(suggesting that the Plantar project will lessen ecological destruction). The point here is not to determine
who is right about project disputes, but simply to characterize the types of concerns that come up in public
comment processes on CDM projects.
127
See, e.g., CDM Watch, supra note 124, at 23-25 (describing the reasons for rejection of
some CDM projects).
128
Cf. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151.26 ¶ 9.9 (1992) (calling for renewable energy in a document providing a blueprint for
sustainable development); David M. Driesen, Air Pollution, in STUMBLING, supra note 48, at 257-261.

26

B. Technological Choices Under More Targeted Programs
By contrast with global trading’s emphasis on end-of-the-pipe strategies, more
targeted regulatory programs have increased the use of renewable energy and energy
efficiency.129 On the renewables front, they have catalyzed an enormous increase in wind
power.130 The technological development that these programs have encouraged has
caused a drop in price, which has made wind power a cost effective energy source.131
Photovoltaic module production for solar energy has also increased markedly in
Europe.132 And the prices for solar and biomass technologies have dropped over time,
although usually not to levels that make them cost competitive with heavily subsidized
fossil fuels.133

(discussing Agenda 21’s provisions favoring renewable energy and energy efficiency as part of sustainable
development).
129
See, e.g., Van der Linden et al., supra note 112, at 38 (suggesting that a number of policy
instruments have contributed to increased renewable energy production in Sweden); James W. Moeller, Of
Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio
Standards, and the Evolution of Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. J. 69, 73-77 (2004) (explaining that a federal requirement that electric utilities purchase power
from renewable energy sources played a “significant role” in expanding renewable power generation); cf.
Choi, supra note 5, at 891 n. 86 (claiming that the acid rain program has discouraged use of renewable
energy, in spite of the establishment of reserve allowances to provide incentives to use it).
130
See Frederic C. Menz & Stephan Vacon, The Effectiveness of Different Policy Regimes
for Promoting Wind Power: Experiences from the States, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1786 (2006) (finding that
renewable portfolio standards have stimulated increased production of wind power); 2004 Commission
Energy Evaluation supra note 110, at 19 (finding noting that wind power grew by 23% in 2003, exceeding
EU wind target); see also Ford et al., supra note 111, at 92 n. 4 (explaining that the Texas renewable
portfolio standard produced the “Texas Wind Rush,” the installation of 10 new wind projects in 2001
producing 930 megawatts of power).
131
Jeffrey Greenblatt et al., Baseload Wind Energy: Modeling Competition Between Gas
Turbines and Compressed air Energy Storage for Supplemental Generation, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 1474, 1474
(2007) (attributing a 30% annual increase in installed wind capacity to a “twofold drop in capital costs
between 1992 and 2001” and “government initiatives.”); 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation, supra note
110, at 19 (finding that wind costs have fallen by 50% over the last 15 years).
132
See 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation, supra note 110, at 20-21.
133
See Mona Hymei, The United States Experience with Energy-Based Tax Incentives: The
Evidence Supporting Tax Incentives for Renewable Energy, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No.
06-21 (2006), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=896987 (discussing United States subsidies for fossil fuels and
renewable energy); Bert Metz & Detlef van Vuuren, How, and at What Costs, can Low-Level Stabilization
be Achieved?- An Overview, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 339 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber
et al. eds. (2006)) [hereinafter DANGEROUS] (noting that renewable energy today represent one of the most
expensive options for greenhouse gas mitigation); Bernardo Barreto & Socrates Kypreos, Emissions
Trading and Technology Deployment in an Energy-Systems “Bottom-up” Model with Technology
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We have also seen an obvious innovation in vehicle technology, as many
companies have begun offering hybrid vehicles that reduce reliance on gasoline, using a
battery’s electricity to help power the vehicle. These vehicles typically offer increased
energy efficiency and reduced carbon dioxide emissions.134 Manufacturers have
introduced hybrids in order to comply with California regulations requiring Low
Emission Vehicles (LEV).135 These regulations at their core involve a performance
standard, which is sufficiently stringent to make it very difficult to rely on conventional
technology as a compliance method. The LEV regulations, however, generally permit
each manufacturer to average its vehicles’ emissions to meet the standards.136 This fleetaverage approach represents a limited use of the trading concept, since it does not allow
credits from non-vehicle emission reductions to count toward meeting the LEV
obligation.137
California has very recently adopted regulations directly limiting carbon
emissions from vehicles sold in that state.138 And China has promulgated ambitious
energy efficiency requirements for vehicles.139 These standards, not the Kyoto
mechanisms, seem the most likely drivers of meaningful technological change in the
motor vehicle industry.
Learning, 158 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 243, 246-48 (2004) (estimating an 86% progress ratio for solar
photovoltaics, representing the rate of cost decline per doubling of production).
134
See Plugging Into the Future, THE ECONOMIST 30 (June 10, 2006) (discussing the fuel
efficiency gains of the Toyota Prius and other hybrid vehicles).
135
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 1960.1 (2006).
136
See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation 17 F.3d 521,
528 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the fleet average approach), on remand, 869 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D.N.Y.
1994), aff’d, 79 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir. 1996).
137
See Keeth, supra note 102, at 726-27 (explaining how manufacturers can comply with
averaging requirements that relaxed the technological demands in the original program’s zero emission
vehicle requirement).
138
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13 § 1961.1(a)-(g) (2006).
139
See Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Pollution from Chinese Coal Casts a Long Global
Shadow, N.Y. TIMES A1, A12 (June 11, 2006) (noting that vehicles sold in China must meet stricter fuel
efficiency standards than those of the United States).
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Traditional regulations and demand-side management programs have increased
energy efficiency.140 In the United States, for example, energy efficiency standards for
appliances have enormously decreased electricity use and associated carbon dioxide
emissions even as appliances have grown in size and their features have improved.141
Demand-side management programs implemented by European governments and state
utility regulators in the United States require electric utilities to choose the most cost
effective approach to matching supply and demand.142 Demand reducing investments in
energy efficiency generally cost less than supply increasing investments in energy
production, so utility demand size management programs have required investments in
energy efficiency.143
Thus, the data suggest that the Kyoto trading mechanisms have primarily
encouraged cheap end-of-the-pipe technologies, which do not significantly change
prevailing development patterns.144 On the other hand, some targeted regulatory
programs have produced more fundamental technological changes. For a decision to
deploy solar power or another renewable energy source in lieu of burning coal changes
the fundamental choice about which fuel to use in producing energy. And energy
efficiency improvements reduce energy consumption, thereby reducing demand for more
energy production, the fundamental driver of climate change.
140

David S. Loughran & Jonathan Kulick, Demand-Side Management and Energy Efficiency
in the United States, 25 ENERGY J. 19, 34 (2004) (utilities reported 180,000 M Wh annual energy efficiency
savings from demand-side management between 1989 and 1999).
141
See Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a
Mandatory U. S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 107 (2005)
(DOE’s appliance efficiency program has produced roughly an annual one quad reduction in energy use).
142
See Ralph Cavanagh, Least Cost Planning Imperatives for Utilities and Their Regulators,
10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 299 (1996) (justifying such a comparison, explaining how to carry it out, and
surveying state programs).
143
See Loughran & Kulick, supra note 140, at 25 (showing that generating a kilowatt hour
costs more than twice as much as saving a kilowatt hour through energy efficiency).
144
Cf. Choi, supra note 5, at 951 (arguing that “addressing global climate change requires
fundamental changes in human behavior”).
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IV. ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
AND MARKET LIBERALISM
Our person in India and others like her have been choosing traditional end-of-thepipe technologies as the principal means of earning carbon credits. This result will
surprise many readers of the instrument choice literature. For that literature generally
associates “end-of-the-pipe” technology with high cost “command and control”
regulation and links emissions trading to innovation and pollution prevention.145
The failure to choose renewables suggests that minimizing short term cost does
not maximize productive long-term technological change. This part argues that positive
spillovers not captured by the actor making the change make technological innovation
very important to sustainable development, but that global emissions trading markets do
not adequately take spillovers into account. It then presents a theory explaining why
global trading has not encouraged renewable energy as well as more targeted government
programs. Finally, this part draws lessons from emissions trading’s neglect of positive
spillovers for the relationship between sustainable development and market liberalism. It
explains that environmental law must address an unacknowledged tension between
maximizing near-term efficiency and promoting sustainable development.
A. Is Expensive Innovation Desirable?: Spillovers and Sustainable Development
Even if our entrepreneur would choose a cheap command and control technique
over a more innovative solar energy technology, we might not regard trading’s favoring
of that choice as proof of a conflict between market liberalism and sustainable
145

See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation: A Failing Paradigm, 15 J.L. &
COM. 585, 592 (1996) (contrasting the “existing technology-based system[’s]” emphasis on “end-of-pipe”
controls with trading’s encouragement of “process changes and conservation”); Richard B. Stewart,
Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 155, 166
(1988) (technology-based regulation requires installation of “pollution control” technology, while
“economic incentives” encourage “new products or production technologies”).
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development. If we employ soft versions of both market liberalism and sustainable
development we can rationalize a comfortable marriage using the trading approach. As
already suggested, soft market liberalism accepts some role for government regulation,
especially when it uses economic incentives. A soft version of sustainable development
would demand nothing more than some actions addressing environmental problems with
significant future consequences. In that case, the choice to control HFC combines cost
effective market liberalism with sustainable development, since the choice cost
effectively realizes a real reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. On the other hand, if
we give greater weight to future generations’ interests, we may find sustainable
development and market liberalism in some tension, even in the emissions trading
realm.146
1. Technological Innovation’s Importance to Sustainable Development
Technological innovation is crucial to efforts to protect future generations’
interest.147 For that reason, both Agenda 21, an international agreement sometimes
described as sustainable development’s blueprint, and the Brundtland Report emphasize
the needs for renewable energy, like the solar project our entrepreneur considered.148

146

See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 3 (suggesting that renewables policies
might be justified without carbon benefits because of falling costs over time) with Jos Sijm, The Interaction
Between the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and National Energy Policy, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 79, 94 (2005)
(suggesting that energy security , equity, “raising fiscal resources,” ancillary environmental benefits, and
dynamic efficiency may justify energy policy, but that allowance trading makes it unnecessary for carbon
reduction purposes).
147
I define technological innovation as use of a technology that significantly advances the
state of the art. See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 75-77; David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation,
in MOVING TO MARKETS, supra note 53, at 437-38. While I frame much of my argument about spillover
neglect in terms of technological innovation, market-neglected positive spillovers can arise from high
quality non-innovative technology as well.
148
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151.26 ¶ 9.9 (1992) (calling for increased use of renewable energy and energy efficiency);
WCED, supra note 9, at 188 (calling for giving the “highest priority” to the development of renewable
energy).
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This idea of a key role for technological innovation in sustainable development
focuses significant attention upon choices about “economic development” itself, which
includes fundamental choices about how to produce goods and services. The economist
Herman Daly has argued that sustainable development should aim to reduce, or at least
stabilize, “through-put” - the use of natural resources and inputs and waste streams as
output.149 He opposes economic growth defined in terms of increased throughput,
because he finds such growth unsustainable.150 He favors, however, economic
development, which he defines as improvements of living standards that come without
increased through-put.151 This vision seems to require changes, such as increased use of
solar power, that enable us to produce goods and services without consuming nonrenewable fossil fuels and generating excessive waste. Making changes that allow for
economic development without using up non-renewable resources requires significant
technological innovation.152
We need not go as far as Daly would to find that protection of future generations
in the climate change context requires significant innovation in how the world produces
and uses energy. Indeed, climate change experts seem to agree that seriously addressing
climate change requires significant changes in energy production and use.153 Recently,
several climate scientists have attempted to estimate the amount of carbon dioxide
149

Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend, Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility
Theorem, in VALUING THE EARTH 271 (1992).
150
Id. at 267-68.
151
Id. at 268.
152
See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 89 (explaining the link between Daly’s idea of reduced
throughput and technological innovation)
153
Interview with Lewis Milford, Clean Air Group, Clean Energy Group (July 5, 2006)
(claiming that experts agree that the world needs significant innovation in how energy is produced to
adequately address climate change). See, e.g., DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 102-106 (discussing
technological options to address climate change with emphasis on options involving significant
technological changes); Baumert, supra note 3, at 388 (stating that effectively addressing climate change
requires “large-scale technological and behavioral changes.”).
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reductions needed to avoid some of climate change’s key dangers. While estimates vary,
they envision cuts on the order of 50% below global 1990 levels by the year 2050.154
Since the world’s most populous countries, China and India, are currently building new
coal-fired power plants to service their rapidly industrializing countries, realizing such
sizable cuts will require dramatic changes in how the world produces and uses energy.155
A moderate version of inter-generational sustainability might not countenance the
damage to future generations that a failure to produce this drastic reduction would cause.
For scientists associate a 3°C increase in global temperatures (an increase well within the
range scientists expect) with drastic consequences.156 From the standpoint of sustainable
development, a technological change that contributes to a process of technological
development leading, in the long term, to significant fossil fuel displacement has much
more value than deployment of a conventional technology that contributes nothing to this
long-term process.157 The cutting edge technology offers more protection to future
generations, even if both, in the short term, deliver equivalent direct greenhouse gas
emission reductions.

154

See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 155-158 (suggesting that avoiding a 3 °C
temperature rise may require a 40% cut from 2010 levels by 2050 and more than a 60% cut by 2100);
James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope: How Much Global Warming Constitutes “Dangerous Anthropogenic
Interference, 68 CLIMATE CHANGE 269, 277 (2005) (stating that a 2°C temperature rise “almost surely takes
us well into the realm of dangerous” climate change); Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2°C Target Mean
for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? A Brief Analysis Based on Multi-Gas Emission Pathways and
Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in DANGEROUS, supra note 133, at 269-70 (estimating
that limiting temperature rise to less than 2°C likely requires a 55% reduction below 1990 emission levels
by 2050).
155
See Bradsher & Barboza, supra note 139 (explaining that Chinese coal-fired power plants
will probably increase greenhouse gas emissions by 5 times the amount of cuts from Kyoto and that India is
following suit).
156
See James E. Hansen, Global Warming: Is There Still Time to Avoid Disastrous HumanMade Climate Change? i.e. Have We Passed a Tipping Point? 26-29 (2006), http://www.columbia.edu
/~jeh1/nas_24april2006.pdf (providing maps of areas that would probably be under water if temperature
increased by 3° C).
157
See generally Choi, supra note 5, at 872 (claiming that development of renewable energy
and increased energy efficiency can move the world toward sustainable development).
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This implies that governments should choose strategies to meet Kyoto targets that
help make realization of more ambitious future targets feasible. Nobody believes that
Kyoto’s contemplated 5% cut in developed country emissions meets the Framework
Convention’s goal of avoiding dangerous climate change. The countries ratifying the
Kyoto Protocol saw it as a first step toward seriously addressing this goal.158
Technological choices under the Kyoto Protocol advance sustainable development when
they contribute to making more ambitious future goals feasible.
2. Positive Spillovers’ Importance
The economic concept of a spillover helps explains innovation’s value. When
somebody advances the state of an art, these advances often fuel positive “spillovers” —
benefits that do not generate rents for the original innovator, such as contributions to
further advances by competing firms.159 Economists have long recognized that firms and
individuals under-invest in innovation for several reasons. First, undertaking innovation
often involves substantial expense with an uncertain payoff.160 Second, potential
innovators tend to underinvest in technological change because the innovating firm
cannot capture all of an innovation’s positive benefits.161
Patent law allows innovators to keep some of the rents from innovation in order to
address markets’ failures to adequately stimulate innovation.162 At the same time, patent

158
159

KOLBERT, supra note 71, at 166.
See Brett Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 258-261

(2007).
160

See POSNER, supra note 16, at 123 (commenting that uncertainty lies at the “core” of
technological innovation, because “scientific progress is unpredictable.”).
161
See ID. at 123-24 (third parties’ ability to use information makes it difficult for inventors
to keep all the value their inventions create); Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation
and Intellectual Property Innovation: A New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMPLE J. ENVTL. L. & TECH.
51, 56 (2006) (if a person “builds a better mousetrap,” others may copy it).
162
Id. at 283 (explaining that intellectual property law allows innovators to capture some,
but “not all” of innovation’s value).
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law (and intellectual property law generally) recognizes positive spillovers’ value and
seeks to encourage realization of spillovers’ benefits by allowing some open access to
information embedded in intellectual property.163 In exchange for a patent giving an
innovator a monopoly in an invention’s production, the patent law requires publication of
the patent, which discloses the invention’s design details to competitors.164 Publication
facilitates other firms’ efforts to build on the advances justifying the patent.165 Other
intellectual property law features, limits on the term of property rights, the lack of
property rights in ideas and facts, and allowance for fair use of copyrighted material also
reflect recognition of positive spillovers’ value.166
Positive spillovers from technological choices in addressing climate change (or
other long-term environmental problems) play a vital role in advancing sustainable
development. An advance in solar energy technology, for example, may fuel other
advances increasing solar energy’s utility (perhaps for cloudy climates) or lowering its
future costs.167 Increasing the utility of renewable energy makes it a more viable
substitute for fossil fuels exacerbating global warming, thus making an important longterm contribution to addressing global warming above and beyond the carbon reduction
associated with a particular renewable energy project’s relatively direct carbon reduction
benefits.168
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Id. at 282-93 (explaining that both copyright and patent law create a “semicommons”
combining private property rights and commons elements).
164
Id. at 291 (explaining that patent law “requires the patent owner to teach the public how
to make and use the invention”).
165
Id. at 292.
166
See id. at 282-293 (explaining why these features and others promote positive spillovers).
167
See generally, Steffen Kallbekken & Nathan Rive, Why Delaying Emission Cuts is a
Gamble, in DANGEROUS, supra note 133, at 315 (explaining that technological change can influence
pollution abatement’s cost and feasibility).
168
See Eban Goodstein, Prices Versus Policy: Which Path to Clean Technology, in THE
LONG-TERM ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: BEYOND A DOUBLING OF GREENHOUSE GAS
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Facilitation of long-term switches from fossil fuels not only helps protect future
generations from climate change’s environmental and economic harms, but avoids more
direct economic problems associated with fossil fuel use. Fossil fuels cannot supply
energy indefinitely and may prove very costly over time. Because fossil fuel resources
are finite, their price will eventually rise.169 Current investment in alternatives to fossil
fuels reduces the cost of making these switches later with less technological history170
and also avoids potential supply shortages during a transition. Switching before fossil
fuels run out or become scarce reduces the economic damage and environmental harms
future generations will suffer.
In addition to these long-term positive spillovers, renewable energy generates
near term positive spillovers. For example, selection of solar power as a method of
reducing carbon will also reduce emissions of conventional air pollution.171 These
conventional pollutants have made big contributions’ to many developing countries’
failure to provide a healthful life for their people, i.e. to meet the current generation’s
needs.172 Thus, positive spillovers can serve sustainable development not only by
advancing future generations’ interests, but also by better meeting the current
generations’ basic needs.
CONCENTRATIONS 225 (Darwin C. Hall & Richard B. Howarth eds. 2001) (identifying early investment in
clean technology with avoidance of “ongoing residual damage from carbon emissions”).
169
Cf. Choi, supra note 5, at 951 (claiming that recent crude oil prices indicate that “fossil
fuels have already begun to be in short supply.”).
170
See id. at 233 (explaining in detail why earlier investment in clean technology reduces
costs).
171
See Luis Mundaca & Hakan Rodhe, CDM Wind-Energy Projects: Exploring Small
Capacity Thresholds and Low Performances, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 399, 405 (2005) (wind energy reduces
harmful sulfur dioxide emissions to zero); Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental
Skepticism: The Implications of Bjorn Lomborg’s `The Skeptical Environmentalist’ for Environmental Law
and Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 223, 263 (2003) (noting incidental reductions in sulfur dioxide, nitrogen
oxides, volatile organic compounds, and particulates).
172
See UNCED, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 1, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26, Annex I (1992) (recognizing a human right to a “healthy life” based on the centrality of
human beings to sustainable development).
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If our entrepreneur’s solar energy project generates sufficiently valuable positive
spillovers, then our entrepreneur should invest in the solar option.173 While a calculus
based only on least cost carbon reductions directly associated with current projects favors
HFC 23, a broader consideration of positive spillovers and sustainable development may
favor the more expensive carbon abatement choice.
3. Valuable Innovation May Prove Initially Expensive
The adage “you get what you pay for” suggests that often technological choices
producing significant positive spillovers will prove initially expensive. While our
entrepreneur’s choice offers but one example of the tradeoff between near term cost
effectiveness (narrowly defined) and realization of positive spillovers’ benefits, this
tradeoff may be quite widespread. Solar energy constitutes a high quality environmental
product offering a significant array of advantages not just a cheap fix to a single problem.
These advantages include avoidance of a variety of forms of conventional air pollution,
enhanced energy security, and avoidance of environmental damages associated with
extracting fossil fuels from the earth. This high quality product, however, commands a
price that reflects significant research and development costs, which often are needed to
develop major technological advances. Cars, computers, and many other products stem
from technological advances that produced expensive luxury goods that ultimately
become cheap enough to enjoy a mass market. It is likely that some crucial innovation
significant enough to make a major difference for a serious long-term environmental
challenge like global warming while simultaneously addressing other environmental and
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See generally Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 113, at 62 (“providing a jump start to
technology learning” can yield significant future benefits).
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developmental needs will prove initially expensive. Certainly, renewable energy seems
to conform to the model of an initially expensive good offering high quality.
High short-term costs do not, however, necessarily imply high long-term costs.
Today’s expensive technology can become tomorrow’s cheap routine way of offering a
better life. Economists studying innovation have noticed that firms learn from the
experience of manufacturing new products and that this learning by doing can lower costs
and improve product quality over time in unpredictable ways.174 Learning seems to have
occurred in the case of renewable energy, even with rather modest use of it, for
renewable energy’s price has generally fallen over time.175 The tendency of firms to
learn from efforts to make products implies that choosing environmental instruments that
encourage initially expensive innovation can provide experience lowering long-term
costs.
The solar example illustrates another feature of the tension between long-term and
short-term costs. Solar energy requires an expensive capital investment, but no fuel
costs. This means that as time goes on, the total costs can become cheaper than that of an
approach like fossil fuel generation, which generates fuel costs year after year, costs that
will rise when fossil fuel becomes scarce.176 Hence, expensive innovation may have high
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See Patrick Matschoss & Heinz Welsch, International Emissions Trading and Induced
Carbon-Saving Technological Change: Effects of Restricting the Trade in Carbon Rights, 33 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 169, 172 (2006) (associating learning by doing with assuming that learning comes from
production); Barreto & Kypreos, supra note 133, at 245-46 (“learning . . . plays an important role” in
improving technologies’ cost and performance).
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See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 3 (most forms of renewable energy
are “undergoing a strong cost decrease”); Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 113, at 17, 51-52 (explaining that
the potential for learning by doing is high for renewable energy); Leo Schrattenholzer, Experience Curves
of Photovoltaic Technologies 3 (2000), http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-00-014.pdf
(photovoltaic modules experienced a 20% cost decline with each doubling of installed capacity on
average).
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Cf. DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 83-85 (providing a numerical example to illustrate how
long term and short term costs may diverge)
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value and low long-term costs, which should make it highly desirable from a long-term
perspective.
The neoliberal perspective tends to deny the value of initially expensive
innovation through the technique of discounting future benefits.177 Because current
technological improvement’s costs occur today and many of the benefits accrue far in the
future, reliance on discounting tends to produce analysis disapproving of significant near
term efforts to protect future generations (like the employment of solar energy).178
Economists favor discounting because it reflects the observed preferences of market
participants, who tend to value current costs and benefits more highly than future costs
and benefits.179 But sustainable development proponents tend to treat this preference for
short-sightedness as a problem to be overcome, not something to institutionalize in
formal CBA.180 Hence, neoliberals and sustainable development advocates diverge, to
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See generally Kysar, supra note 171, at 266 (stating that economic models used to
estimate the costs and benefits of mitigating climate change “use a mathematical discount rate . . . to
significantly reduce” future harms’ value); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999); Kenneth Arrow et al.,
Intertemporal Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 125 (James P. Bruce et al. eds. 1996).
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See POSNER, supra note 16, at 151-52 (recognizing that application of a discount rate
tends to “obliterate” future generations’ interests in contexts like that of global warming, because the
discounting drastically reduces valuation of future harms).
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See John L. Donohue, Why We Should Discount The Views of Those Who Discount
Discounting, 108 YALE L. J. 1901, 1905 (1999) (a person would prefer saving ten lives today over saving
ten lives seven years from now).
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See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 171, at 266-67 (questioning the “moral basis” for discounting
human lives saved and other future benefits of climate change policies); Douglas A. Kysar, Climate
Change, Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 578585 (2004) (discussing discounting’s moral issues in the climate change context); David A. Dana, A
Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003) (defending
the precautionary principle as a means of correcting for cognitive bias favoring short term cost avoidance
over long-term risk avoidance); see also Lisa Heinzerling, Discounting Life, 108 YALE L. J. 1911 (1999);
Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future: Discount Rates, Later
Generations, and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267 (1993); Edith Brown Weiss, The Planetary
Trust: Conservation and Intergenerational Equity, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 495 (1984). See generally Kysar,
supra note 8, at 2134 (noting that sustainable development proponents do not accept existing preferences as
immutable).
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some degree, in how much value they attach to positive spillovers generating future
benefits.
B. Why Global Emissions Trading Does Not Favor Valuable Innovation
Carbon markets encourage people like our entrepreneur to “internalize” some of
the value of carbon savings from environmental projects. In this, a carbon trading
program resembles conventional performance standards and pollution taxes aimed at
carbon, both of which would also add a price to goods and services reflecting costs
associated with global warming. This section focuses on the question of whether global
carbon markets tend to stimulate valuable innovations as a major means of realizing
carbon reduction benefits.
I make a weak and a strong claim regarding global carbon markets and
innovation. The weak claim is simply that global carbon trading markets do not
systematically remedy the underinvestment in innovation that spillover analysis reveals.
The strong claim is that a global trading program stimulates valuable innovation more
weakly than a performance standard of identical stringency. These claims imply that
environmental law must address a tradeoff between near term efficiency and long-term
sustainability.
1. Global Emissions Trading’s Failure to Remedy Spillover Neglect
Rational actors in the carbon markets will take direct carbon benefits into account
as they choose projects, but they will not necessarily take into account projects’ positive
spillovers. And these spillovers will vary. For example, the HFC project seems to offer
no long-term technological development prospects (owing to the phase out of the
production process to which it is attached) and no collateral environmental benefits. Still,
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our Indian entrepreneur may not choose the solar project, because she receives no
economic benefit from competitors building upon lessons learned from her solar
installation or from lowered conventional pollution associated with her choice. This
failure of global trading markets to encourage rational actors to take positive spillovers
into account, means, at a minimum, that emissions trading provides no panacea for the
problem of insufficient investment in environmental innovation.
By contrast, targeted renewable energy programs have a specific goal of
stimulating sufficient investment in renewables. By either requiring deployment of
renewable energy or offering a high tariff for it, they pay for long-term economic
development. Indeed, they do this precisely because of recognition of some of the
broader non-carbon benefits of renewables, such as long-term technological
development, heightened energy security, and reductions in conventional pollution.181
Thus, items that appear as spillovers, not internalized in carbon markets, become
rationales for expenditures aiding sustainable development in targeted energy programs.
This suggests that targeted programs aimed at producing positive spillovers may provide
better incentives for valuable innovation than global trading programs.
2. Global Trading Programs Provide Weaker Incentives for Valuable Innovation
than Performance Standards of Identical Stringency
Indeed, for any given level of stringency, a global emissions trading program
offers a weaker incentives for valuable innovation than a performance standard of
identical stringency. Emissions trading proponents have claimed that trading provides
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See Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: The
Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 4-5 (2006) (discussing
these factors as aims of EU policy on renewables).
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stronger incentives for innovation than traditional regulation.182 I confine my contrary
claim of global trading’s inferiority to relatively expensive innovation. Furthermore, I do
not argue that trading is incapable of stimulating expensive innovation if sufficiently
stringent. I only argue that for any given level of stringency, e.g. a given carbon
reduction target, a performance standard creates better incentives for valuable innovation
than a trading program. Holding the level of stringency constant allows one to explore
the fundamental attributes of emissions trading, by eliminating variables other than
instrument choice. My claim implies that global emissions trading generally loses
important positive spillovers.
The conventional claim that trading encourages innovation better than traditional
regulation generally relies upon the observation that emissions trading, unlike traditional
regulation, encourages polluters to go beyond compliance.183 This suggests that an
emissions trading program would provide a better incentive for innovation than a
traditional regulation implementing the same underlying emission limit.
This analysis, however, focuses on credit sellers alone and ignores buyers.184
Credit buyers face weaker incentives to innovate under a trading program than they
would face under a performance standard of identical stringency that does not allow for

182

See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 17, at 19 (stating that “economic incentive
systems,” including emissions trading, have an advantage over command and control regulation in
stimulating “continuing innovation.”); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments in for Global Climate
Change: How Can Government Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 302-03; Robert
W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era for an Old Idea,
18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 13 (1991); Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-35 (1988); Stewart, supra
note 144, at 160.
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Adam B. Jaffe et al., Environmental Policy and Technological Change, 22 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 41, 51 (2002) (economic incentives stimulate innovation by paying firms to clean up “a
bit more.”); David A. Malueg, Emissions Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution
Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 52, at 8-9 & n. 33 (1987).
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See Driesen, supra note 147, at 434-35 (explaining how the traditional focus on sellers
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trades.185 Those who buy credits would do so because they face relatively high control
costs. Trading allows buyers to escape from implementing expensive control measures at
their own facilities. Without trading, however, they would face significant incentives to
innovate, as innovation would provide the only way of escaping a conventional
approach’s high control costs. Thus trading provides inferior innovation incentives for
owners of half of the sources in a perfect trading market.
Precise analysis of trading’s impact on innovation requires us to ask the following
question: Does trading shifting emission reductions from high cost to low-cost facilities
provides better net incentives for innovation than those an identical performance standard
would provide if regulators allowed no trading?186 A growing numbers of economists
have questioned the claim that emissions trading always provides superior incentives for
innovation.187 And a recent detailed empirical analysis of sulfur dioxide controls in the
utility industry argues that more innovation occurred under the command-and-control
regime in place prior to 1990 than under the more recent acid rain trading program.188
The acid rain program, emissions trading’s poster child, generally encouraged
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Barreto & Kypreos, supra note 133, at 259 (finding that trading hinders the development
and deployment of low carbon technology in permit buying regions).
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See Driesen, supra note 184, at 433-34 (presenting and defending this analytical
framework); Schwarze, supra note 108, at 56-57 (recognizing that a “fair comparison” between trading and
traditional regulation requires “the same standard”).
187
See, e.g., Joel F. Bruneau, A Note on Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation,
48 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1192 (2004); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits, Standards, and Technological
Innovation, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23 (2002); Juan-Pablo Montero, Market Structure and
Environmental Innovation, 5 J. APPLIED ECON. 293 (2002) (trading, taxes, or traditional regulation can best
encourage research and development when firms’ products are strategic substitutes); Malueg, supra note
131; W. A. Magat, Pollution Control and Technological Advance: A Dynamic Model of the Firm, 5 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 95 (1978); see also David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental
Law: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Emissions Trading, and Priority Setting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501,
519-20 (2004) (stating that trading may have an overall negative affect on innovation); David M. Driesen,
Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10094 (2003) (arguing
that trading may encourage less innovation than a comparable performance standard, but suggesting that it
may change the type of innovation).
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Margaret R. Taylor et al., Regulation as the Mother of Invention: The Case of SO2
Control, 27 L. & POL’Y 348, 370 (2005) (concluding that trading encouraged less innovation than command
and control).
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inexpensive but traditional compliance strategies, namely use of scrubbers and low sulfur
coal.189
Since most economists tend to focus on efficiency, rather than sustainable
development they generally discuss innovation under the rubric of “dynamic
efficiency.”190 This term refers to the capacity of a program to lower costs through
innovation to maximize net benefits to the current generation.191 Economists do not
usually focus on a program’s capacity to induce high cost innovation for the benefit of
future generations.
Emissions trading provides inferior incentives for relatively expensive innovation,
because emissions trading lowers routine compliance’s cost.192 This means that trading
lowers the price point where innovation becomes cost effective. To see this imagine two
pollution source owners. One of these polluters, who we’ll call Buyer, has marginal
control costs of $1,000 per ton of carbon reduction. The other, who we’ll call Seller, has
marginal control costs of $500.00 a ton. If we require each of these sources to meet a
carbon reduction target of 100 tons, a performance standard approach, then Buyer will
acquire an incentive to seek out innovations costing less than $1,000.00 a ton. If we
allow trading, however, Buyer will be able to purchase 100 extra $500.00 per ton
reductions from Seller instead of achieving compliance locally. Under this scenario only
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See id. (discussing reliance on wet scrubbers and low sulfur coals); Choi, supra note 5, at
887 (stating that the acid rain program has encouraged reliance on low-sulfur coal and scrubber
installation); Swift, supra note 60, at 10332 (describing scrubbing and low-sulfur coals as the principle
compliance means, but finding innovation in blending techniques and scrubber design); cf. David Popp,
Pollution Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990, 22 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641 (2003)
(finding more patenting of scrubber technology under command and control than under the acid rain
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See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 71.
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See ID.
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See Driesen, supra note 52, at 336 (pointing out that spatial flexibility makes it easier “to
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innovations costing less than $500.00 a ton begin to penetrate the industry.193 Hence,
trading eliminates incentives for relatively costly innovations that would be economic in
a non-trading program of comparable stringency.
Trading proponents point out that vast differences in marginal control costs are
common. This is the reason that trading generates substantial costs savings. This means
that trading should lower the marginal control costs for an industry substantially, thereby
significantly reducing incentives for relatively expensive innovation.
The observation that reducing the cost of routine compliance should reduce
incentives for valuable innovation is consistent with a hypothesis economists commonly
employ in analyzing innovation, the induced innovation hypothesis. This hypothesis
assumes that rational actors innovate when adhering to routine becomes too costly.194
That assumption would suggest that lowering routine compliance costs through trading
would reduce, not augment, incentives for relatively expensive innovation.
Our entrepreneur’s choice can illustrate the reasons for trading’s tendency to
favor cheap routine measures over valuable innovation. As she decides whether to
employ solar energy or an end-of-the-pipe control she probably thinks about her potential
customer, the German electric utility owner. The rational actor model would predict that
this customer will only want to pay for credits costing less than his utility’s marginal
193

In reality, marginal control costs usually rise as a facility increases reductions. Thus, this
example is oversimplified. But this simplification does not influence the results. Even if the low cost
facility generates incurs higher costs for the reductions sold to buyer than for the reductions made to merely
achieve compliance, these extra reductions must still cost substantially less than the cost of routine
compliance at buyers’ firm to make trading worthwhile.
Indeed, the example in some ways understates the depth of global trading’s weakness in
stimulating expensive innovation. One would expect trading to lower the marginal control costs of a large
group of buyers, which might constitute about half of the participants in a trading program. And it would
systematically lower the costs, and hence the price points innovators must meet, to the level of the cheapest
reductions available anywhere within the universe of sources eligible to generate credits. In a global
market, that universe is likely to be large and the opportunities for cheap routine reductions enormous.
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Cf. Matschoss & Welsch, supra note 174, at 173 (referring to this hypothesis as the
assumption of “induced factor-saving technological change”).
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control cost. Hence, if a solar installation costs more than the marginal cost of local
control in Germany, our entrepreneur cannot hope to recoup her investment if she invests
in solar energy. Renewable energy often costs a lot and innovative new renewable
energy technology may reflect significant research and development costs.195
Even if local conditions in sunny India are so propitious for solar energy that our
entrepreneur can generate carbon credits costing less than the German utility’s local
costs,196 she may think twice before investing in a novel solar energy technology. When
she sells her credits, she may have to compete with other entrepreneurs for the sale. This
competition may induce her to choose the cheapest option, even if both options cost less
than the German utility’s marginal cost.197 In other words, competition may pressure our
entrepreneur to choose the end-of-the-pipe approach. Market reports do claim that HFC
reduction costs much less than renewable power, so the available data support the theory
that trading disfavors relatively expensive innovation.198
This analysis helps explain why targeted regulatory programs should perform
better than global emissions trading in encouraging renewable energy. The Kyoto
Protocol contemplates a 5% drop in developed country emissions. Achieving this target
through a global trading program should encourage a whole series of projects like the
195

See Paolo Bertoldi et al., White, Green & Brown Certificates: How to Make the Most of
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least investment).
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See Ellis & Karousakis, supra note 125, at 8 -9 (stating that renewable energy projects
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HFC project, which cost much less than renewable energy projects. If, however, the
world creates a renewable portfolio standard demanding that new renewable energy
deployment create a 5% drop in carbon emissions, thus limiting the range of reduction
options, this will create more valuable innovation — innovation with significant positive
spillovers. Hence, recognition of the tension between global cost effectiveness and
targeted innovation efforts can help explain why the data presented should not be
surprising.
Some project developers acting in the global carbon markets, however, have
chosen to develop renewable energy projects, albeit on a relatively small scale.199 The
existence of these projects suggests that market actors may not fully conform to the
rational actor model, which assumes that actors maximize their profits by seeking low
cost projects.200 Some credit purchasers may wish to enhance their reputations by
purchasing credits reflecting renewable energy projects.201 Indeed, sustainable
development advocates have developed a “gold standard” for CDM projects, giving
projects advancing sustainable development an environmentalist seal of approval.202 This
approach suggests that these advocates see market decisions as susceptible to social and
political influences, not only profit maximizing behavior.203
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See Ellis & Karousakis, supra note 125, at 8.
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I do not claim that a categorical rule prohibits trading from stimulating renewable
energy. Indeed, as governments impose more stringent caps on sources raising their
control costs, the ability of renewable energy projects to play some role should increase.
The data in this paper generally represent a very early picture of the trading market’s
response to the EU’s phase one emission limits and the inchoate possibility of stricter
limits in phase two. The insight at the core of my claim, however, that lowering cost
does not increase incentives for valuable innovation is fully consistent with standard
economic models that show a correlation between technological incentives and permit
prices.204 Nor do I claim that traditional regulation does a wonderful job of stimulating
innovation, although it sometimes has done so when sufficiently stringent.205 I make
only the narrow claim that a performance standard encourages greater use of valuable
innovation than a trading program of identical stringency. This claim suggests a tradeoff
between short term cost effectiveness and investment in long-term environmental and
economic development.206

Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 529 (2004)
(explaining that information about how goods are produced can influence consumer choice).
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C. Implications for Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism
Recognizing the value of positive spillovers exposes the tension between the
short-term cost effectiveness markets favor and long term economic and environmental
progress. This tension has implications for the conceptual relationship between
sustainable development and market liberalism, for environmental policy, and for
institutional design, which I address in turn.
1. On Sustainable Development’s Relationship to Market Liberalism
If we employ a weak sustainability concept, than any use of technology that
addresses climate change advances sustainable development and the cost effective HFC
solution is fine. If we employ even a moderately strong version of the concept, however,

remain uncapped threatens the program’s integrity, because it creates a potential to give up reductions from
regulated sources in exchange for positive changes that would happen even without a trading program. See
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a rift opens between the partners to Kyoto’s conceptual shotgun marriage. For initially
expensive technological innovation has a vital role to play in sustainable development by
facilitating the protection of future generations from shortages of finite resources and
serious climate change risks. Market liberalism has defects in encouraging future
economic welfare and environmental protection, because it fails to correct private actors’
unwillingness to pay for important positive spillovers.207
2. Lessons for Environmental Law
A moderately strong version of sustainability requires that environmental policy
address the tradeoff between short-term cost effectiveness and long-term sustainable
development.208 The existence of a tradeoff between near-term cost effectiveness and
long-term technological development does not dictate abandonment of global trading, but
it does suggest that an assumption that liberal trading serves as a panacea for failures to
innovate has little justification.209 This tradeoff generates three lessons for environmental
policy.210
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First, policy-makers must consciously seek to encourage innovation, especially
expensive innovation, and not assume that it will come about from just any market-based
approach.211 This lesson is important for climate change policy, because sectoral
programs aimed at stimulating technological innovation can clash in some respects with
global trading. A danger exists that policy-makers may weaken or even eliminate
successful innovation stimulating program to address those tensions. Making innovation
a goal implies respecting the value of a mixture of policy tools, including some that favor
technological innovation over cost effectiveness.212
Second, policy-makers and scholars should more creatively explore the use of
economic incentives and traditional regulation to encourage innovation.213 For example,
consider the idea of an Environmental Competition Statute.214 Instead of relying on
government standard setting (as in emissions trading) or taxation, such a statute would
authorize any company making a pollution reduction to recoup its cost plus a pre-set
premium from competitors with higher emissions.215 Such a system would encourage
firms to compete to maximize environmental quality, rather than respond only to the
limited incentives sometimes timid government officials create by regulatory or taxation
decisions.216

211
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See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 151-161.
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See ID. at 151-54 (explaining that both emissions trading and pollution taxes depend upon
government decisions to drive pollution reduction and suggesting mandatory payments to less polluting
competitors as an alternative).
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See ID. at 154 (explaining that the Environmental Competition Statute relies on polluters
hopes of besting competitors and fears of losing out to them to motivate reductions).
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Third, concern for innovation should play a major role in the design, not just the
selection, of instruments, for innovation depends not just on the selection of regulatory
instruments, but also on rather technical design considerations.217 The LEV program
provides an example of one aspect of design, showing that a narrow trading markets may
better stimulate costly advances in the state-of-the-art than global trading programs. By
limiting averaging to vehicle fleets, instead of fully embracing a global free market
model, California regulators limited trading’s capacity to undermine innovation necessary
to meet stringent performance standards.218 Auto-makers could surely avoid the high
costs of making hybrid vehicles if they could make up the emission reductions by
purchasing cheap credits from any source of relevant emissions in the world.219 The
restriction of trading, however, makes it harder to rely on cheap routine solutions.220
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See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.
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technological improvements”).
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Design plays a critical role in both traditional and “market-based” regulation’s capacity to
stimulate innovation.221
While these principles of making innovation a goal, more creative exploration of
mechanisms, and conscious design for innovation may seem obvious once stated,
scholars and regulators frequently overlook them. This design principle merits further
treatment here, for government’s role in design provides a link between the trading case
and broader institutional issues about the proper roles of governments and markets.
Selection of regulatory targets constitutes one of the most important design
considerations for an emissions trading or traditional regulatory program.222 An
emissions trading scheme depends for its efficacy on standard government decisions
about regulatory stringency, i.e. the amount of reductions to require.223 Some have
criticized EU members for allocating too many allowances to industrial sources during
the EU Trading Scheme’s first phase.224 By setting a cap near, or in some cases, above
then current emission levels the EU arguably lost an opportunity to make significant
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carbon reductions in phase one and to provide some incentives for innovation.225
Conversely, if governments set ambitious caps for emissions trading schemes, these can
greatly increase pressure for significant technological changes. This relationship between
regulatory stringency and incentives for technological advancement is not unique to
emissions trading.226 Government decisions determining the stringency of performance
standards or the amount of pollution taxes also influence the magnitude of incentives to
innovate.227 But proponents of “innovative market-based mechanisms” sometimes
suggest that emissions trading automatically reduces emissions, thereby obscuring the
importance of collective political decision-making in setting caps.228
One can address trading’s weakness in stimulating innovation by increasing the
stringency of the cap. A trading program reducing pollution by X tons encourages
expensive innovation less well than a program of performance standards providing for X
tons of reduction. But if one establishes an innovation premium in the cap, call it I, such
that the cap requires X + I tons of reduction, then innovation performance would
improve. In order for a trading program achieving a reduction of X + I to match the
innovation performance (with respect to high cost innovation) of a performance standard
requiring X tons of reduction, X + I must raise marginal control costs so that they equal
the marginal control costs of achieving X through performance standards. Since trading
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“failed to boost alternatives.”).
226
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significantly lowers marginal control costs, the innovation premium necessary to meet
this condition would be quite high.
In principle, the choice to use emissions trading should make it easier to set more
stringent caps than regulators would set for a traditional regulation.229 Since emissions
trading lowers compliance costs, government officials making cost sensitive decisions
should feel more comfortable setting ambitious goals when it uses trading than when it
employs a traditional performance standard. Market liberalism in the selection of
regulatory means may contribute to governments’ willingness to establish regulatory
goals compatible with sustainable development.
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume, without further research, that an inexorable
political economy law always makes instrument choice a critical determinant of
stringency. The European Union, for example, favored stringent targets while opposing
broad liberal trading.230 And the United States in the past has supported bans on some
chemicals and stringent standards for other pollutants without fully exploring costs and
with little or no reliance upon trading.231 This suggests that factors other than cost
effectiveness may influence government policy choices.232
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Governments’ sensitivity to estimates of future costs may vary with their leaders’
attitudes toward neoliberalism. The United States’ opposition to Kyoto in spite of its use
of trading and statist Europe’s support for targets without global trading suggest as
much.233 Trading cannot save an agreement from a government determined to eschew
regulation altogether and it may not be necessary to persuade other governments to sign
up. The idea that sensitivity to cost may vary with ideology is also congruent with
empirical research on risk perception, showing a correlation between individual attitudes
toward risk and more general attitudes toward governments and markets.234
Furthermore, trading’s cost savings can only influence goal setting if policy
makers consider those cost savings before they materialize.235 If trading succeeds in
uncovering cost effective reductions not obvious to regulators, it follows that it further
weakens the officials’ ability to predict future costs. Hence, setting goals that take
trading’s cost savings into account may require a leap of faith that some may not be
prepared to make.236
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The literature on political economy explains that polluters may favor
grandfathered trading programs over pollution taxes, because only taxes leave them with
costs for residual emission.237 But a preference for trading does not inexorably make
industry supporters of strict targets.238 Industry federations in many countries have
fought for weak caps, greatly weakening the EU’s trading scheme’s first phase.239
It is unlikely that the political economic advantages of trading will make it
feasible to adopt a cap with an innovation premium sufficient to offset the innovation
losses from trading (for expensive innovation). The increased stringency deprives
polluters of the cost savings that trading would otherwise provide. Moreover, since
polluters will likely have little or no information about the marginal cost of reductions at
others’ facilities that they might purchase, they may evaluate a proposed cap of X + I in
terms of the cost of making all of the reductions at their own facilities, attributing little or
no cost reduction to the market. Their own abatement costs (not taking into account cost
savings from trade) will be much higher for limit X+1 than for limit X. And vigorous
industry opposition to a more stringent cap decreases the likelihood of government
change abatement). Professor Kahan argues that differences among experts reflect their divergent world
views. Kahan, supra note 234, at 1092-1094. He also argues that experts may “screen arguments and
evidence” to protect their status and beliefs. Id. at 1094. This suggests that economists may neglect
learning by doing in economic modeling, because recognizing the importance of something difficult to
quantify threatens their status, but others may create numbers because their worldviews favor doing
something about global warming.
237
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Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 348-51 (1998) (explaining that polluters must pay taxes on residual
emissions, but need not pay for those emissions under trading); James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock,
Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Control Versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 139, 141-142
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See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 5 (explaining how lobbying in the EU
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See Grubb, et al., supra note 222, at 132-33 (describing industry lobbying’s contribution
to the EU’s overallocation of phase one emission allowances); Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87,
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available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/article16056-868.html?articleID=16056&categoryID=
(mentioning a French industry’s advocacy of a high phase two cap).
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compensating for innovation lost through increased stringency. An innovation premium
is a good idea, but it may be difficult to obtain a reasonably ambitious premium.
Market liberalism might ideologically undermine setting goals necessary to
achieve sustainable development, even though free market mechanisms lower costs that
can impede ambitious goal setting.240 Neoliberalism’s political economy may prove
more complicated than many analysts have assumed.241
It would require a book to fully evaluate the myriad ways one might employ
instrument choice and design to address the tension between short term cost-effectiveness
and long-term technological progress. But policymakers must confront this tension both
in choosing and designing instruments.
3. Institutional Relationships (of Government and Markets)
Broadly speaking, market liberalism’s advocates usually envision a broad role for
markets and sustainable development advocates tend to rely more heavily on collective
decision-making. The emissions trading case suggests that the question of the proper role
of governments and markets is much more complicated than generally assumed.
All serious efforts to address environmental protection involve a significant role
for markets and for government. Traditional regulation establishes markets by
demanding environmental improvements that require firms to hire people and/or purchase
equipment to reduce pollution.242 And an economic incentive, in the form of a civil
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See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 950 (attributing the U.S. failure to implement to Kyoto to
“an economic way of thinking,” which stresses “short-term costs rather than long-term benefits.”).
241
See Driesen, supra note 232, at 47 (explaining that no economic reason exists for a
polluter to agree to emissions trading, unless government is willing to impose a more costly alternative).
242
Driesen, supra note 52, at 293; see Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental
Regulation, 15 J. L. COM. 549, 565-66 (1996) (characterizing traditional standards as the most significant
“market force” in environmental protection).

58

penalty for violations of regulatory requirements, encourages them to do so.243 On the
other hand, “free market mechanisms” require active government roles in establishing
goals and in enforcement.244 Ignoring either the economic incentives that regulatory
programs create or government’s role in designing and enforcing them can lead to serious
failures.245
The Kyoto emissions trading case raises questions about the notion that
government should absent itself from oversight of technological choices made in
pursuing environmental goals. Sustainable development advocates believe that
technological choices made in pursuit of one environmental objective, such as carbon
reduction, implicate broader sustainable development concerns that merit consideration
when these choices are made. They tend to evaluate technological choices not only in
terms of their carbon reduction potential, but also in terms of their contribution to longterm technological solutions and their collateral impacts on communities.246 From the
perspective of market liberalism, government processes to consider public comments and
review projects generating credits for their impacts on sustainable development constitute
“transaction costs” impeding markets, which governments should minimize.247 Serious
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regard for sustainable development, however, requires some consideration of positive and
negative externalities inherent in technological choices.248 This suggests that
governments should not reflexively reduce transaction costs (such as opportunities for
public comment) without considering the corollary benefits the transaction costs
purchase, such as the opportunity to consider spillovers benefiting future generations and
intragenerational equity.249 More fundamentally, the existence of these externalities
raises questions about the neoliberal assumption that single-minded cost effective pursuit
of a single goal through emissions trading constitutes an adequate vision of technological
choice for sustainable development.
The positive spillovers and negative externalities stemming from technological
choices also raise questions about the internal consistency of market liberalism. Many
advocates of CBA’s use in defining environmental goals defend it, in part, by pointing
out that government must evaluate risk/risk tradeoffs.250 This tradeoff concept refers to
the danger that industry response to a mandate to reduce one form of pollution may
increase other more serious risks, a danger sustainability advocates have cited in
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opposing CDM projects like the eucalyptus plantation mentioned previously.251 NYU
Dean Richard Revesz has responded to the risk/risk critique by pointing out that reducing
a targeted risk often reduces another corollary risk.252 For example, if our entrepreneur
chooses a solar project to reduce carbon, her project will also displace smog-producing
pollution from a nearby coal-fired power plant that severely threatens health in the near
term. Of course, firms’ technological choices determine the existence and scope of
ancillary risks and benefits. This implies that in order to use CBA to evaluate collateral
risks (and benefits), government must know in advance what technologies firms will use
to comply with government standards and must consider the associated risks (and
collateral benefits). Yet, the use of a global market reduces the government’s ability to
predict technological choices, thereby undermining CBA.253
Indeed, global trading fundamentally undermines even a sharply circumscribed
CBA focusing only on projections of direct costs and targeted benefits. For the cost of
reducing any environmental risk depends on the technological choices made in
addressing it.254 If the government uses a trading mechanism, it undermines its ability to
estimate these future costs.255 For increasing spatial flexibility widens the universe of
possible technological options thereby complicating prediction of technological choices.
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Of course, policy-makers can reduce this tension by not relying on cost calculation in
setting goals or by eschewing broad liberal trading. But broad liberal trading reduces
government’s capacity to accurately estimate future costs and benefits in setting goals.256
Trading’s capacity to undermine CBA suggests a tension between market
liberalism’s institutional preference for markets and its analytical concepts. For these
concepts demand a comprehensive consideration of costs and benefits, while markets rely
on the decisions of private actors, who may only consider their actions’ costs and benefits
to themselves.257
On the other hand, sustainable development advocates have not shown how their
preferred concept should concretely guide government regulation. Its vagaries may serve
well as a framework for democratic debate.258 But the rubric does not function precisely
as a guide to macro-level decisions.259 This imprecision may constitute a virtue in some
settings, but it leaves sustainable development open to charges of irrationality.
The trading case reveals that sustainable development advocates face some other
challenges in seeking to apply collective decision-making to technological choices.
Richard Stewart has likened “command-and-control” regulation to discredited Soviet
style central planning.260 This charge clearly exaggerates the depth of technological
control regulators exercise through traditional regulation. As a rule, traditional regulation
256
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only demands a specified improvement in environmental performance from a particular
industry.261 It does not fix production quotas, nor does it commonly dictate fundamental
technological choices, such as fuel choice for power production.262
But sustainable development’s call for collective decision-making and integrated
planning seems to require substantial community control over fundamental technological
choices, much more control than either traditional regulation or emissions trading usually
offers. While both sustainable development and economic rationality may require some
role for collective decision-making in making fundamental technological choices, it is not
clear that government should make key technological choices by itself.263 Public choice
theory, another contribution of neoliberal thinking, predicts that special interests will
heavily influence government decision-making.264 Many sustainability advocates would
agree with that analysis.265
Sustainable development advocates seek to overcome special interest dominance
through public participation, greater transparency, and integrated planning. Some of the
insights of neoliberalism suggest that these efforts face challenges going beyond the
261
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power of special interests. Even if the economists’ call to discount future benefits is at
war with sustainable development, their recognition that people tend to discount future
benefits reflects a widespread reality. This suggests that sustainable development’s
procedural allegiance to integrated planning may not lead to achievement of sustainable
development’s substantive aspirations. For many people participating in collective
decision-making may prove reluctant to incur costs in order to protect future generations’
welfare.266 The sustainable development project, however, represents a belief that
collective participation can increase willingness to incur short term costs in order to
achieve long-term benefits.
The question of how to design institutions to make wise fundamental
technological changes presents a puzzle, a puzzle that lies sadly buried under much
simplistic rhetoric about “economic incentives” and “command and control” regulation.
The puzzle arises from market actors’ systematic tendency to view such choices too
narrowly coupled with the tendency of governments to avoid visible short term costs and
offense to special interests. It’s likely that the proper solution to this puzzle will vary
from country to country and will involve some mixture of government choices and
private initiative. In contexts like climate change, where we ultimately lead major
technological changes, the appropriate choices will recognize and address the tradeoff
between market liberalism’s preference for cost effectiveness and the need for
investments advancing sustainable development to protect future generations.

266

See Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 864 (2006)
(stating that public resistance to paying now to reduce future risks fits standard claims about discounting).

64

V. CONCLUSION
The emissions trading experience under the Kyoto Protocol suggests that weak
market liberalism might manage to co-exist with weak sustainability. Either a strong
preference for markets (as opposed to economic concepts) or a strong concept of
sustainability, however, tends to sever the union. Liberal markets, even markets designed
for environmental protection, often fail to encourage expensive investments leading to
long-term benefits because of positive spillovers.
This implies that environmental law must address a tension between cost
effectiveness maximization of long-term technological capability. This tension should
influence both instrument choice and design.
The problem of the proper role of collective decision-making in technological
change poses a puzzle requiring much closer attention. Emissions trading’s tendency to
undermine CBA suggests that neoliberalism’s institutional direction conflicts with its
analytical predilections and with sustainable development. On the other hand, collective
decision-making does not provide a panacea either, as shortsightedness can infect both
public and private spheres. Study of the emissions trading experience under the Kyoto
Protocol yields fascinating insights about the relationship between sustainable
development and market liberalism. We can only hope that the nations of the world will
build on these insights as they move forward in addressing climate change and other
major global challenges.
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